Category: Ukraine

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More than ‘Just’ Disinformation: Russia’s Information Operations in the Nordic Region

This book chapter by Anke Schmidt-Felzmann from the Swedish Institute of International Affairs provides an overview of Russian disinformation tactics and messages in the Nordic countries of Finland, Sweden, Denmark, and Norway, and Iceland.

The author begins with the context of why Russia would be interested in social-political influence in the region: Norway and Finland share borders with Russia; Norway is a net exporter of oil and gas, and thus in competition with Russia on world energy markets; Denmark and Russia have an ongoing dispute over resource-rich territories along the continental shelf; Sweden has a visible role in political reform in Ukraine, and in the EU’s Eastern Partnership initiative.

Perhaps more importantly, the five Nordic countries have strong relationships with both NATO and the EU – although only Iceland, Denmark, and Norway are NATO members. All five countries responded with condemnation of Russia’s annexation of Crimea, including the implementation of sanctions.

Schmidt-Felzmann discusses Russia’s use of different channels, social media, and IT tools for “socio-psychological manipulation” in the Nordic region. Interestingly, she singles out the manipulation of individual human beings as both targets and tools of misinformation including journalists and politicians. Tactics cited by the author include intimidation and disinformation campaigns against individuals critical of Russian policies, and the use of trolls and bots on social media. The case of Finnish journalist Jessikka Aro is an interesting example. In 2015 while investigating online trolling, her reporting identified the building in St. Petersburg housing the now-infamous Internet Research Agency. She soon became the target of personal attacks and harassment on social media by the same trolls.

According to Schmidt-Felzmann, Russian information operations in the Nordic region seem to be aimed at discrediting NATO and the EU, and positioning Russia as an innocent victim of “Russophobia” promulgated by the West. Accusations of anti-Russian bias are leveled against journalists and politicians on Russian-sponsored media, online forums, and social media platforms,

Interestingly, Schmidt-Felzmann says, Russian attempts to establish Nordic platforms for its news operations Sputnik and RT failed less than a year after their launch in 2015.

In summary, the Nordic nations appear to have shown considerable resistance to Russian information operations, and are engaged with the EU and NATO in developing multinational research centers and countermeasures such as identifying and responding to disinformation, training on how to identify malicious information, coordinating the exchange of information between agencies…and developing their own influence operations.

Reference

Schmidt-Felzmann, Anke. 2017. “More than ‘Just’ Disinformation: Russia’s Information Operations in the Nordic Region.” In Information Warfare. New Security Challenge for Europe, 32–67. Centre for European and North Atlantic Affairs.

 

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Information Warfare in the Internet: Countering Pro-Kremlin Disinformation in the CEE Countries

In this report, published in 2017 by the Poland-based Centre for International Relations and funded by the International Visegrad Fund, authors from seven Central and East European Countries analyze disinformation tactics, channels, and messaging currently used by Russia targeting their respective nations. Data used was drawn from the period between July and October 2017, although general trends were also assessed. The authors find that while Russia’s propaganda tactics are similar throughout the CEE countries, messages are often tailored to maximize impact based on the politics of each country.

The presentation of country-specific data in the report follows a similar format. For example, the section on the Czech Republic, written by Jonáš Syrovatka from the the Prague Security Studies Institute, describes the channels used to spread propagandistic messages, and the reach of each channel. The main channels are conspiracy websites, alternative media, semi-legitimate “bridge media,” Facebook, and YouTube. Messaging and language vary depending on the normative style and tone of each channel. Syrovatka identifies the combination of channels and messaging used as key to propagandistic influence. Subjects of the messages in the Czech Republic include the danger of Islamization, violence by refugees as a strategy by global elites including Hillary Clinton ad Emmanuel Macron, corruption and incompetence of the Ukrainian government, and positive narratives concerning Vladimir Putin and Russia.

Among the country-specific differences:

  • In Hungary, pro-Kremlin narratives are often promoted by mainstream newspapers and broadcast channels, including the state-owned news agency MTI. Much of the messaging content skirts the line between authentic Hungarian pro-Eastern sentiments and Kremlin-sponsored propaganda, rather than pure disinformation. With three million Hungarian retirees, chain mail is also used to spread pro-Kremin narratives. Facebook is the predominant social media platform used, due to Hungary’s lack of “Twitter culture.” Propagandistic messages are aimed to undermine trust in the U.S., NATO and the EU, encourage anti-immigration and anti-refugee views,  discredit liberal ideas about human rights and NGOs, and to discredit Ukraine as corrupt, fascist, and failing.
  • In Moldava, Petru Macovei, Executive Director of the Association of Independent Press at the Chisinau School of Advanced Journalism, reports that Russian influence is powerfully exerted through mass media outlets created by Russia, including a Moldavan edition of Komsomolskaya Pravda and Sputnik.md. Twitter and Facebook are also used as channels. Narratives include conspiracy theories about NATO preparing for nuclear war against Russia with Moldava as a battlefield, that Moldava is ruled by an outsider network connected with George Soros, that the U.S., NATO, and NGOs are conspiring against Moldavan interests and promoting homosexuality, and that the U.S. is defending the Islamic State in Syria.
  • In Poland, tactics and propaganda messages are much the same: that NATO is a tool of America and is acting again Poland, and that Russia is the only counter to American influence. Poland-specific narratives include disinformation targeting Ukraine, wherein Ukrainians are portrayed as “wild and cruel beasts mindlessly slaughtering Poles.” Polish mass media, websites, and social media are leveraged for these narratives, along with an interesting twist: fake interview with top Polish generals which invariably position the West as anti-Poland, and as promoting homosexuality. According to journalist Antoni Wierzejski, author of the section on Poland, hackers and trolls are very active in Poland.
  • The section on Ukraine, authored by Margo Gontar, journalist and co-founder of the Ukrainian organization StopFake, summarized four disinformation themes: Ukraine is a failed state, Ukrainians are dangerous, Ukraine is breaking the Minsk Agreement to stop the war in the Donbass region of Ukraine, and that everyone loves Russia. At the same time, according to other research identified in this project, various actors in Ukraine are mounting somewhat effective information campaigns to counter Russian propaganda. It is of note, though, that anti-Ukraine disinformation is featured so prominently in the other CEE nations.

As we see in other research, social media is an important channel for the spread of disinformation and participatory propaganda. But the authors emphasize it is the combined impact of traditional media, state-sponsored news organizations, conspiracy websites, trolls and hackers, and social media that is the basis for Russia’s propaganda strategy.

The report concludes with a number of recommendations to counter Russian disinformation, including more research on its authors and target audiences, education of the public on information ethics, and encouraging Internet companies to deploy tools against fake news. All of which are worth attempting, and possibly inadequate unless done at a very large scale.

Reference

Wierzejski, Antoni, Jonáš Syrovatka, Daniel Bartha, Botond Feledy, András Rácz, Petru Macovei, Dušan Fischer, and Margo Gontar. 2017. “Information Warfare in the Internet COUNTERING PRO-KREMLIN DISINFORMATION IN THE CEE COUNTRIES.” Centre for International Relations. https://www.academia.edu/34620712/Information_warfare_in_the_Internet_COUNTERING_PRO-KREMLIN_DISINFORMATION_IN_THE_CEE_COUNTRIES_Centre_for_International_Relations_and_Partners.

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Stoking the Flames: Russian Information Operations in Turkey

It can be argued that Russia scored a major goal on October 7, 2019 when U.S. President Trump tweeted that he would withdraw American troops from the war zone in northeastern Syria, and that “Turkey, Europe, Syria, Iran, Iraq, Russia and the Kurds will now have to…figure the situation out.” This cleared the way for Turkey to launch a large-scale military operation against America’s allies, the Kurdish PKK. The sudden change in U.S. policy caught just about everyone off-guard – the Kurds, NATO, the U.S. State Department and members of Congress, and even the U.S. military commanders in Syria.

In the 2018 article “Stoking the Flames: Russian Information Operations in Turkey,” published in the journal Ukraine Analytica, University of Copenhagen political scientist Balkan Devlen details Russia’s shifting propaganda narrative targeting Turkish audiences. During and after it 2014 invasion in Crimea, Russia sought to portray Ukraine as a corrupt ally of the “imperialist West,” and Russia as an anti-imperialist friend to Turkey. A variety of media outlets were used to spread this message, including the Turkish language service of Russia’s Sputnik News, and a range of Turkish media sources known to be suspicious of Western and American meddling in the region. As shown by other research on Russian disinformation strategies, a variety of social media outlets were also used.

After the downing of a Russian jet by the Turkish air force in 2015, Russia’s propaganda massaging in Turkey did a 180-degree turn and began targeting the Turkish government and its foreign policy, claiming that Turkey was supporting ISIS, violating international law, and committing war crimes. Balkan notes that Russia’s anti-Turkey propaganda campaign was immediate, robust, and agile, suggesting that Russia is well-prepared to launch disinformation campaigns against even friendly nations, with messaging developed in advance should the need arise.

In 2016 relations between Russia and Turkey became friendly, and the torrent of anti-Turkish disinformation quicky ceased. A new phase of propaganda sought to increase suspicion and animosity toward the U.S. and NATO, and to once again portray Russia as a true friend. As anti-American sentiment sentiment increases among the Turkish population, this narrative has been picked up by Turkey’s major media and amplified by Eurasianist “fellow travellers” through various channels.

Balkan concludes that as relations between Turkey, the U.S., and NATO fray, “Russia gets closer to its goal of weakening and undermining the liberal international order.”

While it is possible to read Balkan’s article as a polemic, much of his argument is echoed by other research annotated in this Political Propaganda and Social Media project. It might also be worth noting that some of the propaganda messages deployed by Russia in Turkey, such as the message that Ukraine is a corrupt nation, are mirrored in tweets by the U.S. president.

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Russia’s Improved Information Operations: From Georgia to Crimea

In the Western press much attention has been focused on Russia’s interference in the 2016 U.S. election, by spreading disinformation broadly on the Internet and social media platforms. Russia (and of course the United States) has long used propaganda as a psychological weapon in hot wars, cold wars, and even times of relative peace. In an article published in the US Army War College journal Parameters, Emilio Iasiello, a cyberintelligence advisor to Fortune 100 clients, says “nonkinetic options” are now a core part of Russia’s military and geopolitical strategy: using information and deception to disrupt opponents and influence internal and global audiences.

But propaganda hasn’t always prevailed. Iasiello reviews Russia’s information operations in its 2008 invasion of Georgia, and finds that Georgia ultimately won the information war. Russia relied on pre-Internet propaganda tactics such as using traditional media to deliver key messaging to the international community, and trying to position Georgia as the aggressor and Russia as merely defending its citizens. But Georgia fought back with its own extensive counterinformation campaign, and ultimately won the battle for international support.

Iasiello says Russia may have lost the Georgian conflict, but learned that the Internet could be used as a weapon and began revising and expanding its information war strategy. In its 2014 annexation of the Crimean region in Ukraine, Russia applied the lessons from the Georgian conflict to orchestrate a rapid and nearly bloodless victory. Russian state actors directed cyberattacks to shut down Crimea’s telecommunications and websites, and to jam the mobile phones of key Ukrainian officials. Russian hackers intercepted documents on Ukrainian military strategy, launched DDOS attacks on Ukrainian and NATO websites, disrupted the Ukrainian Central Election Commission network, planted “fake news” on fake websites and Russian media, and employed a cadre of trolls to comment on news and social media for the purpose of distorting reality and confusing Ukraine’s allies.

According to Iasiello, the 2014 Crimean annexation was a case study in the use of social media to control messaging and sow discord among the Ukrainian population and the international community. Thus the birth of Russia’s new strategy for “hybrid” warfare, using trolls, fake websites, social media, and the international news media to massively spread disinformation and confusion about the conflict.

Iasiello says Russia is vastly outpacing the United States on information war tactics, and using its experience to refine its strategies for different conflicts. In essence, Russia is playing the long game to sow discord and division, so as to weaken Western alliances. His recommendations include developing a U.S. counterinformation center, using analytics and artificial intelligence to identify online disinformation, and increasing international cooperation to combat various forms of Russian propaganda. He concludes that the Internet and social media are now an international battleground, and Russia is currently winning the information war.

Reference

Iasiello, Emilio. 2017. “Russia’s Improved Information Operations: From Georgia to Crimea.” US Army War College: Parameters [Summer 2017], US Army War College Quarterly: Parameters, 47 (2): 51–63. https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=803998.