Information Warfare in the Internet: Countering Pro-Kremlin Disinformation in the CEE Countries

In this report, published in 2017 by the Poland-based Centre for International Relations and funded by the International Visegrad Fund, authors from seven Central and East European Countries analyze disinformation tactics, channels, and messaging currently used by Russia targeting their respective nations. Data used was drawn from the period between July and October 2017, although general trends were also assessed. The authors find that while Russia’s propaganda tactics are similar throughout the CEE countries, messages are often tailored to maximize impact based on the politics of each country.

The presentation of country-specific data in the report follows a similar format. For example, the section on the Czech Republic, written by Jonáš Syrovatka from the the Prague Security Studies Institute, describes the channels used to spread propagandistic messages, and the reach of each channel. The main channels are conspiracy websites, alternative media, semi-legitimate “bridge media,” Facebook, and YouTube. Messaging and language vary depending on the normative style and tone of each channel. Syrovatka identifies the combination of channels and messaging used as key to propagandistic influence. Subjects of the messages in the Czech Republic include the danger of Islamization, violence by refugees as a strategy by global elites including Hillary Clinton ad Emmanuel Macron, corruption and incompetence of the Ukrainian government, and positive narratives concerning Vladimir Putin and Russia.

Among the country-specific differences:

  • In Hungary, pro-Kremlin narratives are often promoted by mainstream newspapers and broadcast channels, including the state-owned news agency MTI. Much of the messaging content skirts the line between authentic Hungarian pro-Eastern sentiments and Kremlin-sponsored propaganda, rather than pure disinformation. With three million Hungarian retirees, chain mail is also used to spread pro-Kremin narratives. Facebook is the predominant social media platform used, due to Hungary’s lack of “Twitter culture.” Propagandistic messages are aimed to undermine trust in the U.S., NATO and the EU, encourage anti-immigration and anti-refugee views,  discredit liberal ideas about human rights and NGOs, and to discredit Ukraine as corrupt, fascist, and failing.
  • In Moldava, Petru Macovei, Executive Director of the Association of Independent Press at the Chisinau School of Advanced Journalism, reports that Russian influence is powerfully exerted through mass media outlets created by Russia, including a Moldavan edition of Komsomolskaya Pravda and Sputnik.md. Twitter and Facebook are also used as channels. Narratives include conspiracy theories about NATO preparing for nuclear war against Russia with Moldava as a battlefield, that Moldava is ruled by an outsider network connected with George Soros, that the U.S., NATO, and NGOs are conspiring against Moldavan interests and promoting homosexuality, and that the U.S. is defending the Islamic State in Syria.
  • In Poland, tactics and propaganda messages are much the same: that NATO is a tool of America and is acting again Poland, and that Russia is the only counter to American influence. Poland-specific narratives include disinformation targeting Ukraine, wherein Ukrainians are portrayed as “wild and cruel beasts mindlessly slaughtering Poles.” Polish mass media, websites, and social media are leveraged for these narratives, along with an interesting twist: fake interview with top Polish generals which invariably position the West as anti-Poland, and as promoting homosexuality. According to journalist Antoni Wierzejski, author of the section on Poland, hackers and trolls are very active in Poland.
  • The section on Ukraine, authored by Margo Gontar, journalist and co-founder of the Ukrainian organization StopFake, summarized four disinformation themes: Ukraine is a failed state, Ukrainians are dangerous, Ukraine is breaking the Minsk Agreement to stop the war in the Donbass region of Ukraine, and that everyone loves Russia. At the same time, according to other research identified in this project, various actors in Ukraine are mounting somewhat effective information campaigns to counter Russian propaganda. It is of note, though, that anti-Ukraine disinformation is featured so prominently in the other CEE nations.

As we see in other research, social media is an important channel for the spread of disinformation and participatory propaganda. But the authors emphasize it is the combined impact of traditional media, state-sponsored news organizations, conspiracy websites, trolls and hackers, and social media that is the basis for Russia’s propaganda strategy.

The report concludes with a number of recommendations to counter Russian disinformation, including more research on its authors and target audiences, education of the public on information ethics, and encouraging Internet companies to deploy tools against fake news. All of which are worth attempting, and possibly inadequate unless done at a very large scale.

Reference

Wierzejski, Antoni, Jonáš Syrovatka, Daniel Bartha, Botond Feledy, András Rácz, Petru Macovei, Dušan Fischer, and Margo Gontar. 2017. “Information Warfare in the Internet COUNTERING PRO-KREMLIN DISINFORMATION IN THE CEE COUNTRIES.” Centre for International Relations. https://www.academia.edu/34620712/Information_warfare_in_the_Internet_COUNTERING_PRO-KREMLIN_DISINFORMATION_IN_THE_CEE_COUNTRIES_Centre_for_International_Relations_and_Partners.