Ethics—at least virtue ethics—broadly speaking has a tight knit connection to metaphysics, in that ‘good x’ is taken to be more or less synonymous with ‘x-ness’. A good pen is one that writes, which does what it is that pens do, and—I guess—just is what a pen is: what is a pen that doesn’t write?
I am happy with this story, though I am hesitant to think that it is very illuminating if what you think we need to do to understand what is right or wrong is then perform a metaphysical investigation into the nature of things. For: we (also) take our regular experience of things (and the language which has formed around that) to be constitutive of what it means to be good!, and I find it highly implausible to think we can separate these things out and place a priority on is-ness independent of our societal norms, culture, and values.
In defense of metaphysics, ethical claims are statements about how you will be if you do such and such a thing. Only you are capable of determining what you feel to be your (most pressing) object of desire, so ethics cannot contradict you if you say ‘but I want this’. It can, however, point out that getting what you (now) want won’t always bring (and in the past, in fact, has not always brought) about your satisfaction (eudaemonia). As a formalized discipline, ethics draws from the observation that the input-output relation between action and personal (emotional) homeostasis (stability) is not something we can accurately control only by apriori reflection on what we surface level want. This I can appreciate. Still, I want to push that any possible notions we have of ‘good’ or ‘truth’ depend too much on external linguistic practices to make sense “on their own”.
