

Differential privacy, entropy and security in distributed control of cyber-physical systems

YU WANG, ZHENQI HUANG, SAYAN MITRA, GEIR DULLERUD

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General Question

For distributed control systems, how expensive is it to preserve privacy? How to optimize?

Navigation

- Routing delays vs location privacy

Smart Grid

- Peak demand vs schedule privacy

Section I:

On Differential Privacy of Distributed Control System

Distributed control

Consider a network of vehicles evolving in a shared environment (road congestion)

State of each agent (vehicle) x_i

- Evolve with coupled dynamics (delays)

Agents want to share state to estimate delays


Private preferences p_i ,

- initial states + sequence of waypoint

Report value $z_i = x_i + noise$

Dynamics of agent:

$$\begin{aligned}z_i &= x_i + w_i \\u_i &= g(x_i, p_i, z) \\x_i^+ &= f(x_i, x, u_i)\end{aligned}$$



Some notations

$$\begin{aligned}z_i &= x_i + w_i \\u_i &= g(x_i, p_i, z) \\x_i^+ &= f(x_i, x, u_i)\end{aligned}$$

- Sensitive data set: $D = \{p_i\}_{i \in [N]}$ collects agent preference
 - Two data set D, D' are **adjacent** if they differ in one agent's data
- Observation sequence: $O = \{z(t)\}_{t \in [T]} \in \mathfrak{R}^{\{nNT\}}$
- Trajectory: $\xi = \{x(t)\}_{t \in [T]}$,
 - Fully defined by a data set D and observation O , $\xi_{D,O}$

ϵ -differential privacy

Definition: The randomized communication is **ϵ -differentially private** with $\epsilon > 0$, if for all **adjacent** datasets D and D' for all subset of observations S ,

$$\Pr[O_D \in S] \leq e^\epsilon \Pr[O_{D'} \in S]$$

- Difference in one agent's data doesn't change the output distribution much
- Small ϵ , high privacy; $\epsilon \rightarrow 0$, no communication; $\epsilon \rightarrow \infty$, no privacy
- How to design the noise to achieve ϵ -differential privacy?


Laplace mechanism for one-shot queries [Dwork06]

No dynamics involve, just exchanging initial states

- $p_i \in \mathfrak{R}$ is the initial state of agent i

Laplace mechanism: $z_i = p_i + \text{Lap}\left(\frac{1}{\epsilon}\right)$ gives ϵ -differential privacy for any ϵ

- $\text{Lap}\left(\frac{1}{\epsilon}\right)$ has p.d.f. : $f(x) = \frac{\epsilon}{2} e^{-\epsilon|x|}$
- $\forall x, x': \frac{f(x)}{f(x')} \leq e^{\epsilon|x-x'|}$
- The average reported value is $\sum z_i$ which gives DP with accuracy bounds





When dynamics come into the picture

Definition: the **sensitivity** of the system is supremum 1-norm between agent trajectories

$$S(t) = \sup_{\substack{\text{adj}(D,D') \\ O \in Obs}} |\xi_{D,O,i}(t) - \xi_{D',O,i}(t)|_1$$

- Sensitivity is a property of dynamics of the network
- It can be computed [HiCoNS2014], [CAV2014]



Laplace Mechanism for dynamical systems

Theorem: The following distributed control system is ϵ -differentially private:

- at each time t , each agent adds an vector of independent Laplace noise $Lap(\frac{S(t)T}{\epsilon})$ to its actual state:

$$z(t) = x_i(t) + Lap\left(\frac{S(t)T}{\epsilon}\right)$$

- Larger time horizon, higher privacy level, larger sensitivity \Rightarrow more noise \Rightarrow worse accuracy



Cost of Privacy

$$\text{Average Cost: } Cost_p = \frac{1}{N} \sum_{t=0}^T \sum_i |x_i(t) - p_i(t)|^2$$

Baseline cost \overline{Cost}_p : the cost when $z_i(t) = x_i(t)$

- No noise



The **Cost of Privacy** of a DP mechanism M is:

$$\mathbf{CoP} = \sup_p \mathbf{E}[Cost_p - \overline{Cost}_p]$$



CoP for linear dynamical system

For stable dynamics: $\text{CoP} \sim O\left(\frac{T^3}{N^2 \epsilon^2}\right)$,
otherwise exponential in T





Summary

Extend the notion of differential privacy to dynamical systems

Generalize Laplace mechanism to dynamical observation using sensitivity of trajectories

For stable dynamics $\text{CoP} \sim O\left(\frac{T^3}{N^2 \epsilon^2}\right)$, otherwise, exponential in T

Section II:
Entropy-minimization of Differential Privacy



Feedback control system

$$\begin{aligned}z &= x + w \\x^+ &= f(x, z)\end{aligned}$$

- Feedback control of agent:
 - Sensitive data: x_0 initial state of agent
 - Protecting the initial state is equivalent to protecting the whole trajectory
 - Observation sequence: $O = \{z(t)\}_{t \in [T]}$
- Question: how much information is lost by adding noise?
How to minimize the information loss?



Estimation & Entropy

Definition. An **estimate** of the agent's initial state is the expectation of the initial state given the history of the agents' report

$$\tilde{x}_t = \mathbf{E}[x_0 | z_0, z_1, \dots, z_t]$$

Definition. The **entropy** of a random variable x with probability distribution function $f(x)$ is defined as

$$H(x) = -\int f(x) \ln x \, dx$$



Entropy-minimization problem

For minimizing the amount of information loss for achieving differential privacy, we design the noise w to be added :

Minimize $H(\tilde{x}_t)$

Subject to: $\forall a, b: P[\tilde{x}_t = a] \leq e^{\epsilon|a-b|} P[\tilde{x}_t = b]$



Result for one-shot case

$$z = x + w$$

The estimate $\tilde{x} \in \mathfrak{R}^n$ is computed by the first observation $z \in \mathfrak{R}^n$, no dynamics is involved.

Theorem: The lower-bound of estimate entropy is $n - n \ln \frac{\epsilon}{2}$, which is achieved by adding Laplace noise $w \sim \text{Lap}(1/\epsilon)$



Sketch of proof [CDC14]

- Let $p(x, z)$ be the joint distribution of initial state x and report z , we find a symmetric property
- Claim 1: for any x , $p(x, z - x)$ is even
 - Since the noise to add is $n = z - x$, the noise is mean-zero
- Claim 2: for any c , $p(x, z) = p(2c - x, 2c - z)$
 - The noise added is independent of the state
- We can define $f(w) = f(z - x) = p(x, z)$
- Claim 3: $f(w)$ is non-decreasing



Extension with dynamics

$$\begin{aligned}z &= x + w \\x^+ &= f(x, z)\end{aligned}$$

The estimate $\tilde{x}_t = \mathbb{E}[x_0 | z_0, z_1, \dots, z_t]$ is computed by the first t observation $\{z_s\}_{s \in [T]}$

- **Theorem:** The lower-bound of estimate entropy is still $n - n \ln \frac{\epsilon}{2}$, which is achieved by a Laplace mechanism.



Optimal Laplace mechanism

$$\begin{aligned}z &= x + n \\x^+ &= f(x, z)\end{aligned}$$

- The first noise to add is the same as the one-shot case:

$$w_0 \sim \text{Lap}(1/\epsilon)$$

- In the following round $t > 0$, the noise to be added is by evolving the initial noise with the dynamics:

$$w_t = \xi(w_0, t)$$



Summary


- Formulate a general estimation problem for which we want to minimize the entropy of estimate
- Prove a lower bound of estimation entropy $n - n \ln \frac{\epsilon}{2}$
- The lower bound is achieved by Laplace mechanism

Section III:

Differential Privacy of Distributed Optimization

Architecture

- Local objective functions
- Global constraints
- Communication via the cloud




How to keep objective functions differentially private in communication?

Algorithm

$$x_i \leftarrow \Pi_{X_i} \left[x_i - \gamma_t \left(\frac{\partial f_i}{\partial x_i} + \mu^T \frac{\partial g}{\partial x_i} + \alpha_t x_i \right) \right]$$
$$\mu \leftarrow \Pi_M [\mu + \gamma_t (g(x) - \alpha_t \mu)]$$
$$\mu \leftarrow \mu + v(t)$$


$$\gamma_t = \gamma_1 t^{-c_1}$$
$$\alpha_t = \alpha_1 t^{-c_2}$$
$$c_1 > c_2, c_1 + c_2 < 1$$

For $v(t) = 0$, the algorithm converges to optima.



Assumptions

- Linear objective functions $f_i(x_i) = a_i x_i$
- Lipschitz Constraints $\left\| \frac{\partial g_j}{\partial x_k} \right\| \leq l_{j,k}$
- Completely correlated noise $v(t)$



Privacy

Two sensitive data $D = \{a_1, \dots, a_n\}$ and $D' = \{a_1', \dots, a_n'\}$ are **adjacent** if they differ only in the i th element. The **distance** between them is $\|D - D'\| = \|a_i - a_i'\|$.

The algorithm is **ε -differentially private** if given initial state $x(0), \mu(0)$, the sequence of public multiplier generated by two adjacent sensitive data satisfies

$$\begin{aligned} & Pr \left[\mu_D^{x(0), \mu(0)} \in O \right] \\ & \leq e^{\varepsilon \|D - D'\|} Pr \left[\mu_{D'}^{x(0), \mu(0)} \in O \right] \end{aligned}$$

Accuracy


$$\begin{aligned}x_i &\leftarrow \Pi_{X_i} \left[x_i - \gamma_t \left(\frac{\partial f_i}{\partial x_i} + \mu^T \frac{\partial g}{\partial x_i} + \alpha_t x_i \right) \right] \\ \mu &\leftarrow \Pi_M [\mu + \gamma_t (g(x) - \alpha_t \mu)] \\ &\mu \leftarrow \mu + v(t)\end{aligned}$$

The loss of accuracy is defined by

$$\Lambda_D(T) = \max_{x^{(0)} \in X, \mu^{(0)} \in M} \text{Var} \left[\mu_{D,v^{(T)}}^{x^{(0)}, \mu^{(0)}}(T) - \mu_{D,0}^{x^{(0)}, \mu^{(0)}}(T) \right]$$

Sensitivity

Sensitivity: influence of perturbing the sensitive data on observation



For temporary perturbation on $a(s)$, the noise should be

$$\Delta_s(t) = \begin{cases} 0, & 1 \leq t \leq s \\ \gamma_s \gamma_{s+1} l, & t = s + 1 \\ \gamma_s \gamma_t \prod_{k=s}^{t-1} (1 - \alpha_k \gamma_k) l, & t \geq s + 2 \end{cases}$$

Noise-adding Mechanism

Mechanism: Add noise

$$v(t) = \begin{cases} 0, & t = 1 \\ \gamma_1 \gamma_2 l w, & t = 2 \\ \gamma_t \left(\gamma_{t-1} + \sum_{s=1}^{t-1} \gamma_s \prod_{k=s+1}^{t-1} (1 - \alpha_k \gamma_k) \right) l w, & t \geq 3 \end{cases}$$
$$w \sim \text{Lap}\left(\frac{1}{\varepsilon}\right)$$

Asymptotics

$$v(t) \leq \frac{\gamma_1 l w t^{-(c_1 - c_2)}}{\alpha_1},$$


Trade-off

The loss of accuracy is bounded **asymptotically** by


$$\Lambda_D(T) \leq \frac{2T^2 c_2 l}{\alpha_1^2 \varepsilon^2}$$

higher privacy level \leftrightarrow smaller $\varepsilon \leftrightarrow$ larger $\Lambda_D \leftrightarrow$ larger error

Simulations



The dual trajectory $\mu_{D,v}^{x(0),\mu(0)}(T)$ and $\mu_{D,0}^{x(0),\mu(0)}(T)$



$$\frac{\left| \mu_{D,v}^{x(0),\mu(0)}(T) - \mu_{D,0}^{x(0),\mu(0)}(T) \right|}{\Lambda_D(T)}$$



Summary

- Privacy in distributed optimization
- Trade-off between privacy and accuracy