



Human-aware Science of Security

M. Bashir, K. Keefe, M. Nouredine and W. Sanders

The Science of Security

- Current state of security research
 1. Find a vulnerability
 2. Fix it!
 3. Introduce a new vulnerability or find another one
 4. Fix it! Go to 3.
- We need to study cyber security as a science
 - It's not just a practice
- We need to model and analyze security systems
 - How secure is a system? Under which conditions?
- Design systems that are resilient to known as well as unknown threats or attacks

The Problem

- According to the IBM security services report (2004), 95% of investigated security incidents involve human error.
- Human users are regarded as the weakest link in the cyber security loop
- “The problem exists between the chair and the keyboard” (PEBCAK)
- We need to design and evaluate security systems with humans in the loop
- An area often understudied in design of security systems



In the Literature

- Two trends in human-aware security: Modeling and Usable security
 1. Modeling:
 - Introduce a model of human decision in analogy with the central bank problem in economics [Beautement09]
 - Introduce security ontologies to define information and applications where human factors are vulnerabilities (based on some standards) [Parkin09]
 2. Usable security: Design of human-centric security systems
 - Researchers noted usability issues since 1975 (Saltzer and Schroeder: “psychological acceptability”)
 - Most of the work focused on authentication and email encryption

Our Approach


- Include models of human decision making in models of security systems
- Evaluate the security (as well as performance) of systems in light of the uncertainty of human behavior
- Current research: Human Influenced Task Oriented Process (HITOP) formalism
- Goal: Use techniques from human factors, behavioral economics, human computer interaction (HCI), to design accurate models of human behavior

Human Influenced Task Oriented Process (HITOP)

- We defined the HITOP[Eskins11] formalism
 - Model human actions as a set of tasks
 - Assumption: Humans tend to maximize local utilities
 - Define “human decision points” (HDP) where human decisions are important
 - In a HDP, human either willing to perform security action or not
 - Willingness related to local utility function[Eskins11]
- We are looking to evaluate the accuracy of HITOP in modeling human decisions

Case Study

- We will evaluate HITOP through a model of a nuclear power plant, influenced by Stuxnet



Methodology

- Investigate literature in usable security, human factors, human computer interaction, etc.
- Determine the variables that alter human behavior in favor of poor security decisions
- Devise a model that allows us to simulate such decisions
- Design a system model, an attacker model and a human user model
- Use a simulation tool (Mobius) to evaluate the security (performance) of the system in light of all these variables

Relation to SoS

- Understanding and studying security systems is incomplete without considering human factors
- Understanding and modeling human behavior can help in
 - The assessment of the security of implemented systems
 - The design of new systems that are resilient to threats introduced by human elements

References

- [Beautement09] A. Beautement, R. Coles, J. Griffin, C. Ioannidis, B. Monahan, D. Pym, A. Sasse, and M. Wonham, “Modelling the human and technological costs and benefits of usb memory stick security,” in *Managing Information Risk and the Economics of Security*. Springer, 2009, pp. 141–163.
- [Eskins11] D. Eskins and W. H. Sanders, “The multiple-asymmetric-utility system model: A framework for modeling cyber-human systems,” in *Quantitative Evaluation of Systems (QEST), 2011 Eighth International Conference on*. IEEE, 2011, pp. 233–242.
- [Parkin09] S. E. Parkin, A. van Moorsel, and R. Coles, “An information security ontology incorporating human-behavioural implications,” in *Proceedings of the 2nd International Conference on Security of Information and Networks*. ACM, 2009, pp. 46–55.