

Lecture 4: Safety III

Professor Katie Driggs-Campbell

January 25, 2024

ECE484: Principles of Safe Autonomy

Videos courtesy of Tianchen Ji




Administrivia

- Lab starts this week – will introduce MPO



Core Idea of Inductive Invariants



Adding more information

```
timer := 0
while → if  $x_2 - x_1 < d_s$ 
    if  $v_1 > a_b$ 
        →  $v_1 := v_1 - a_b$  (A)
        timer := timer + 1
    else  $v_1 = 0$  (B)
    else  $v_1 := v_1$  (C)
     $x_1 := x_1 + v_1$ 
     $x_2 := x_2 + v_2$ 
end
```

$$I_3: \text{timer} \leq \frac{v_{i_0} - v_1}{a_b}$$

(1) $q_0. \text{timer} = 0 \leq \frac{v_{i_0} - q_0. v_1}{a_b}$

(2) $q \in I_3 \Rightarrow q' \in I_3$

consider 3 cases

A, B, C



Three Cases to Consider: (1) A

$$q'.timer = q.timer + 1$$

$$\leq \frac{V_{i0} - q.v_i}{a_b} + 1 = \frac{V_{i0} - (q'.v_i + a_b)}{a_b} + 1$$

$$\leq \frac{V_{i0} - q'.v_i}{a_b} \quad \checkmark$$



Three Cases to Consider: (2) \textcircled{B}

$$q'.\text{timer} = q.\text{timer}$$

$$\leq \frac{v_{10} - \boxed{q \cdot v_1}^{>0}}{a_b} \leq \frac{v_{10} + 0}{a_b} \quad \checkmark$$



Three Cases to Consider: (3)

$$q'.\text{timer} = q.\text{timer} \leq \frac{v_{i0} - q.v_i}{a_b}$$

$$\leq \frac{v_{i0} - q'.v_i}{a_b} \quad \checkmark$$

$$I_3: \text{timer} \leq \frac{v_{i0} - v_i}{a_b} \quad \text{and} \quad v_i \geq 0$$

$$\Rightarrow \text{timer} \leq \frac{v_{i0}}{a_b}$$



Showing Safety with a Timer

- Goal: show $x_2 - x_1 > 0$
- Maximum distance traveled by car 1 after detection:

when $t_2 - t_1 < d_s$

$$d_{\max} \leq v_{10} \cdot \text{timer} \leq \frac{v_{10}^2}{a_b}$$


if $d_s > \frac{v_{10}^2}{a_b}$ and $v_2 \geq 0$

then $I_3 \Rightarrow S: x_2 > x_1$




Baked-in Assumptions (1)

- Perception.
 - Sensor detects obstacle **iff** distance $d \leq D_{sense}$
 - How to model vision errors?




1.2.1.2 Vertical Detection Area




Baked-in Assumptions (1)

- Perception.
 - Sensor detects obstacle **iff** distance $d \leq D_{sense}$
 - How to model vision errors?
- Pedestrian Behaviors.
 - Pedestrian is assumed to be moving with constant velocity from initial position




1.2.1.2 Vertical Detection Area




Baked-in Assumptions (1)

- Perception.
 - Sensor detects obstacle **iff** distance $d \leq D_{sense}$
 - How to model vision errors?
- Pedestrian Behaviors.
 - Pedestrian is assumed to be moving with constant velocity from initial position
- No sensing-computation-actuation delay.
 - The time step in which $d \leq D_{sense}$ is true is exactly when the velocity starts to decrease




1.2.1.2 Vertical Detection Area




Baked-in Assumptions (2)

- Mechanical or Dynamical assumptions
 - Vehicle and pedestrian moving in 1-D lane.
 - Does not go backwards.
 - Perfect discrete kinematic model for velocity and acceleration.




Baked-in Assumptions (2)

- Mechanical or Dynamical assumptions
 - Vehicle and pedestrian moving in 1-D lane.
 - Does not go backwards.
 - Perfect discrete kinematic model for velocity and acceleration.
- Nature of time
 - Discrete steps. Each execution of the above function models advancement of time by 1 step. If 1 step = 1 second, $x_1(t + 1) = x_1(t) + v_1(t) \cdot 1$
 - Atomic steps. 1 step = complete (atomic) execution of the program.
 - We cannot directly talk about the states visited after partial execution of program



Remarks and Takeaway



- The proof by induction shows a property of *all behaviors of our model*
- The proof is conceptually simple, but can quickly get tedious and error prone
 - Verification and Validation tools like Z3, Dafny, PVS, CoQ, AST, MC2, automate this




Rare Events and Safety Proxies




Anomalies in Driving Scenes



On-Road Anomaly Detection





On-Road Anomaly Detection




Anomalies in Field Environments



Reactive Anomaly Detection



Reactive Anomaly Detection



Proactive Anomaly Detection



Summary

- Invariant trick can give a shortcut for proving safety 😊
 - The invariant I may contain important information about conserved quantities and may also tell us why the system is safe
 - However, often requires guessing and checking and a lot of engineering effort
- Online Monitoring is another key component to safe systems
 - Anomaly detection is a reasonably proxy for safety, if you don't mind false positives
- Next week: starting perception

