

# Democracy, Dictatorship, and Regime Change

PS 549D, Spring 2013

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*Instructor:* Milan Svolik, Department of Political Science

*Class Meetings:* Thursdays, 3:30 - 5:50 p.m., David Kinley Hall, Room TBD

*Office Hours:* Fridays 3-5pm, 311 DKH, or by appointment

*Email:* [msvolik@illinois.edu](mailto:msvolik@illinois.edu)

*Course Web Page:* <http://compass2g.illinois.edu>

**Description:** This research seminar examines key topics, major contributions, and recent advances in the study of democracy, dictatorship, and regime change.

## Course Requirements:

**Email summaries:** I will ask you to post on Compass and bring to class a summary/discussion (one-paragraphs per reading) of the readings assigned for each class. The post should appear on Compass by noon of the day of the class.

**Presentations of readings:** An important part of your participation will be to present one or several (depending on enrollment) readings of your choice (with the exception of my writings, which I will present.) (★) denotes readings available for presentation. The presentation should first summarize the key points of the reading, then critically evaluate it, and finally raise some questions for class discussion. It should be brief, preferably under 15 minutes.

**Presentation of a non-assigned reading:** I will ask you to present your “favorite” research paper that is somehow related to one of the class topics but not on the syllabus. This should preferably be an unpublished or recently published piece. Please submit your choice early so that we can schedule for it to present under the most appropriate topic.

**A referee report:** A two-page referee report of the first draft of one of your classmates's final paper. A first draft of the final paper (around 5 pages) will be due two weeks before the end of the semester so that we can spend the last meeting of the semester going over your referee reports on the drafts.

**A final research paper:** A 15-20 page paper that either i) develops an original theoretical or empirical approach to a topic chosen by the instructor, or ii) critically reviews a literature on a topic chosen by the instructor.

The final grade will be composed as follows: class participation 30%, final research paper 70%.

**Readings:** Some of the course readings are available electronically via link on Compass; other are on reserve at the library. Students are expected to read all the assigned material *before class*.

## **Course Outline:**

### **Organizational Meeting**

#### **Democracy v. Dictatorship: Conceptual issues**

(★) Cheibub, José A., Gandhi, Jennifer, and Vreeland, James R. 2010. Democracy and dictatorship revisited. *Public Choice*, 143(1):67–101.

(★) pp. 3-16 in Levitsky, Steven and Way, Lucan A. 2010. *Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

*Recommended:*

Diamond, Larry. 2002. Thinking about hybrid regimes. *Journal of Democracy*, 13(2):21–35.

## Transitions to Democracy – Explanations

- (★) Chapter 1 in Przeworski, Adam. 1991. *Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- (★) Introduction and Chapter 1 in Boix, Carles. 2003. *Democracy and Redistribution*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- (★) Woodberry, Robert D. 2012. The missionary roots of liberal democracy. *American Political Science Review*, 106(2):244–274.

### *Recommended:*

Chapters 7-9 and epilogue in Moore, Barrington. 1966. *Social origins of dictatorship and democracy*. Boston: Beacon Press (the rest is strongly recommended).

Chapters 1-2, 4-5, and 6 in Acemoglu, Daron and Robinson, James A. 2005. *Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*. New York: Cambridge University Press (the rest is strongly recommended).

Welzel, Christian and Inglehart, Ronald. 2007. Mass beliefs and democratic institutions. In Carles Boix and Susan C. Stokes, editors, *The Oxford handbook of comparative politics*, pages 297–316. New York: Oxford University Press.

## Transitions to Democracy – Correlates

- (★) Przeworski, Adam and Limongi, Fernando. 1997. Modernization: Theories and facts. *World Politics*, 49(3):155–83.
- (★) Boix, Carles and Stokes, Susan C. 2003. Endogenous Democratization. *World Politics*, 55(4):517–49.
- (★) Acemoglu, Daron, Johnson, Simon, Robinson, James A., and Yared, Pierre. 2008. Income and democracy. *American Economic Review*, 98(3):808–42.
- (★) Boix, Carles. 2011. Democracy, development, and the international system. *American Pol*, 105(4):809–828.

*Recommended:*

- Lipset, Seymour M. 1959. Some Social Requisites for Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy. *American Political Science Review*, 53:69–105.
- Freeman, John R. and Quinn, Dennis P. 2012. The economic origins of democracy reconsidered. *American Political Science Review*, 106(1):58–80.
- Ross, Michael. 2009. Oil and democracy revisited.
- Houle, Christian. 2009. Inequality and democracy: Why inequality harms consolidation but does not affect democratization. *World Politics*, 64(1):589–622.

**Democratic Breakdowns and Consolidation**

- (★) Chapter 1 and 6 in Cheibub, José Antonio. 2007. *Presidentialism, parliamentarism, and democracy*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- (★) Weingast, Barry R. 1997. The Political Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of Law. *American Political Science Review*, 91(June):245–263.
- (★) Chapters 1,2, and 7 in Bermeo, Nancy. 2003. *Ordinary people in extraordinary times: The citizenry and the breakdown of democracy*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
- Svolik, Milan. 2008. Authoritarian reversals and democratic consolidation. *American Political Science Review*, 102(2):153–168.
- Svolik, Milan W. 2013. Learning to love democracy: Electoral accountability and the success of democracy. *American Journal of Political Science*.

*Recommended:*

- Pp. 3-86 in Linz, Juan J. and Stepan, Alfred. 1996. *Problems of democratic transition and consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and post-communist Europe*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Chapter 7 in Acemoglu, Daron and Robinson, James A. 2005. *Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

### **Manipulation, Protest, and Democracy**

Chapters 4-5 and 8-9 in Bunce, Valerie and Wolchik, Sharon L. 2011. *Defeating Authoritarian Leaders in Postcommunist Countries*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Chapters 1-3 in Levitsky, Steven and Way, Lucan A. 2010. *Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Fearon, James D. 2011. Self-enforcing democracy. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 126(4):1661–1708.

Chapters 1, and 3-5 from Simpser, Alberto. 2012. More than winning: Why governments and parties manipulate elections.

#### *Recommended:*

Little, Andrew T. 2012. Elections, fraud, and election monitoring in the shadow of revolution. *Quarterly Journal of Political Science*, 7(3):249–283.

Kuran, Timur. 1991. Now Out of Never: The Element of Surprise in the East European Revolution of 1989. *World Politics*, 44:7–48.

Tucker, Joshua A. 2007. Enough! electoral fraud, collective action problems, and post-communist colored revolutions. *Perspectives on Politics*, 5(4):535–551.

### **Election Administration, Forensics, and Monitoring**

Chapters 1 and 4 in Birch, Sarah. 2011. *Electoral malpractice*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Chapters 1,2, and 4 in Myagkov, Mikhail, Ordeshook, Peter C., and Shakin, Dimitri. 2009. *The Forensics of Election Fraud*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Chapters 1, 4, and 5 in Hyde, Susan D. 2011. *The Pseudo-Democrat's Dilemma: Why Election Observation Became an International Norm*. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.

Ichino, Nahomi and Schüdeln, Matthias. 2012. Deterring or displacing electoral irregularities? spillover effects of observers in a randomized field experiment in Ghana. *Journal of Politics*, 74(1):292–307.

Svolik, Milan and Chernykh, Svitlana. 2013. Third-party actors and the success of democracy: How electoral commissions, courts, and observers shape incentives for election manipulation and post-election protest.

### **Non-democratic Regimes: Concepts and Theories**

Geddes, Barbara. 1999. What do we know about democratization after twenty years? *Annual Review of Political Science*, 2:115–144 and Chapter 2 in Geddes, Barbara. 2003. *Paradigms and sand castles: Theory building and research design in comparative politics*. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.

Chapter 1, “The World of Dictatorial Institutions”, in Gandhi, Jennifer. 2008. *Political Institutions under Dictatorship*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Chapters 1 and 2 in Svobik, Milan W. 2012. *The Politics of Authoritarian Rule*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Chapters 1-3 in Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, Smith, Alastair, Siverson, Randolph M., and Morrow, James D. 2003. *The Logic of Political Survival*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

(FNAR) Chapters 1,2, and 4 from Davenport, Christian. 2010. *State Repression and the Domestic Democratic Peace*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

### **Institutions in Dictatorships**

Myerson, Roger B. 2008. The autocrat's credibility problem and foundations of the constitutional state. *American Political Science Review*, 102(1):125–139.

Przeworski, Adam. 2013. Ruling against rules. In Tom Ginsburg and Alberto Simpser, editors, *Constitutions in Authoritarian Regimes*.

Jensen, Nathan M. et al. 2012. "What do legislatures in authoritarian regimes do?", A blog post.

Introduction and Chapters 2 and 3 in Gandhi, Jennifer. 2008. *Political Institutions under Dictatorship*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Smith, Benjamin. 2005. Life of the party: The origins of regime breakdown and persistence under single-party rule. *World Politics*, 57(3):421–51.

Introduction and Chapter 1 in Magaloni, Beatriz. 2006. *Voting for autocracy: Hegemonic party survival and its demise in Mexico*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Chapters 3-5 in Svobik, Milan W. 2012. *The Politics of Authoritarian Rule*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Malesky, Edmund and Schuler, Paul. 2010. Nodding or needling: Analyzing delegate responsiveness in an authoritarian parliament. *American Political Science Review*, 104(3):482–502.

(FNAR) Reuter, Ora John and Robertson, Graeme B. 2012. "Subnational Appointments in Authoritarian Regimes: Evidence from Russian Gubernatorial Appointments." *Journal of Politics*. 74(4): 1023-1037.

(FNAR) Lust-Okar, Ellen. 2009. Reinforcing Informal Institutions through Authoritarian Elections: Insights from Jordan. *Middle East Law and Governance* 1: 3-37.

## **Dictatorship, Accountability, and Development**

North, Douglass C. and Weingast, Barry R. 1989. Constitutions and commitment: The evolution of institutions governing public choice in seventeenth-century England. *Journal of Economic History*, 49(4):803–832. ISSN 0022-0507.

- Olson, Mancur. 1993. Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development. *American Political Science Review*, 87:567–576.
- Jones, Benjamin F. and Olken, Benjamin A. 2006. Do leaders matter? National leadership and growth since World War II. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 120(3):835–864.
- Wright, Joseph. 2008. Do authoritarian institutions constrain? How legislatures impact economic growth and foreign aid effectiveness. *American Journal of Political Science*, 52(2):322–342.
- Chapter 1 and 3 in Ross, Michael. 2012. *The Oil Curse: How Petroleum Wealth Shapes the Development of Nations*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
- (FNAR) Chapter 4, “Nature or Nurture? Understanding the Culture of Corruption,” in Fisman, Raymond and Edward Miguel. 2008. *Economic Gangsters*.
- (FNAR) Weiss, Jessica Chen. 2013. Authoritarian signaling, mass audiences, and nationalist protest in china. *International Organization*, 67(1):1–35.
- (FNAR) Weeks, Jessica L. 2012. Strongmen and straw men: Authoritarian regimes and the initiation of international conflict. *American Political Science Review*, 106(2):326–347.

## **Final Paper/Referee Report Meeting**