The Lack of Spanish Non-Argumental Clitic Doubling

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1. Introduction

Strozer (1976) identifies a type of reflexive clitic that affects the aspectual interpretation of a predicate. In its presence, the predicate receives a telic interpretation, as illustrated in (1) by the incompatibility of the for-adverbial (see also de Miguel & Fernández Lagunilla 2000, MacDonald 2004, 2006, Nishida 1994 Sanz 2000 and Zagona 1996)

(1) Juan se comió la paella #durante diez minutos.
Juan refl. ate the paella #for ten minutes.
“Juan ate (up) the paella #for ten minutes.”


(2) Juan se comió #(la) paella
John refl. ate #(the) paella
“John ate paella.”

Additionally, observe that this clitic cannot be clitic-doubled (Franco & Huidobro 2008, Strozer 1976), as shown in (3).

(3) Juan se comió la paella (*a sí mismo)
Juan refl. ate the paella (*to himself self)
“John ate (up) the paella”

Our main goal in this paper is to determine why this non-argumental reflexive clitic (NARC) cannot double.\(^2\) Assuming that a clitic and its double form a constituent before clitic raising takes place (Kayne 2005, Uriagereka 2001, 2005) and assuming that the NARC is the complement of a null goal-like preposition (MacDonald 2004, 2006), we locate the NARC doubling impossibility in the inability of the double to get its features valued by the subject of the main predicate. We suggest that if this null goal-like P were a phase head, the facts would follow under the phase impenetrability condition (PIC) (Chomsky 2001, 2004). Nevertheless, in order to arrive at this conclusion, we must first provide evidence that the NARC itself is introduced as the complement of a null goal-like preposition. Thus, in section 2, we discuss three properties that these NARC constructions share with English goal of motion constructions. In section 3, we turn to the restriction on bare nouns, claiming that the same restriction holds for subjects of Spanish as well. In section 4, we offer our proposal for the lack of NARC doubling. Finally, in section 5, we briefly recap the discussion.

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1 Judgments come from native speakers of peninsular Leista Spanish. There appears to be some dialectal variation with respect to some of the properties of the non-argumental reflexive. We do not address this variation here though.

2 By non-argumental, we mean that its presence is optional. It is not selected by the verb. Note that a change in person and number does not affect the properties of this clitic. For simplicity, we typically stick to third person singular throughout the discussion.

2. Three properties shared with goal prepositions

Here we point out three properties that these Spanish NARCs share with English goal prepositions: 1. They both induce a telic interpretation of the predicate; 2. They both have the ability to prevent idiomatic interpretation; and 3. Their presence gives rise to what we will refer to as an on/with entailment.

2.1. First two properties shared with English goal Ps

A well-known fact about English goal Ps is that they can turn an atelic predicate into a telic predicate (Borer 2005, Dowty 1979, Krifka 1992, MacDonald 20008a,b, Pustejovsky 1991, Ritter & Rosen 1998, Tungseth 2005). Observe in (4) that the transitive activity is atelic, evidenced by the compatibility of the for-adverbial and the incompatibility of the time-span adverbial (e.g. in an hour).

(4) a. John carried a bag for an hour/in an hour.
   b. John dragged a log for an hour/in an hour.

When a goal P is added to these sentences, we find the inverse compatibility patterns with the adverbials, indicating that these predicates become telic (i.e. accomplishments), as illustrated in (5).

(5) a. John carried a bag into the room for an hour/in an hour.
   b. John dragged a log into the barn for an hour/in an hour.

Observe also that goal Ps can prevent idiomatic interpretation. Consider the idioms in (6).

(6) a. John spilled the beans.
    b. John kicked the bucket.

    Idiomatic meaning: John divulged information.
    Idiomatic meaning: John died.

When a goal P is added to these idioms, no idiomatic interpretation is available, resulting in the oddity of (7a) and the literal meaning of (7b).

(7) a. #John spilled the beans into the tape recorder. → No idiomatic meaning
    b. John kicked the bucket into the barn. → No idiomatic meaning

Now consider the Spanish NARC with respect to these two properties. Observe that the predicates in (8) allow both the for-adverbial (e.g. durante una hora) and the time span adverbial (e.g. en una hora).

(8) a. Juan comió la paella durante una hora/en una hora
    “Juan ate the paella for an hour/in an hour.”

   b. Juan bebió la cerveza durante una hora/en una hora.
    “Juan drank the beer for an hour/in an hour.”

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3 Consider *John spilled the beans to the police*. Observe that the goal P does not prevent idiomatic interpretation here. This is not totally unexpected, since as pointed in Nunberg et al. (1994) for some idioms, the idiomatic parts can be modified without losing idiomatic interpretation. This does not detract from the point that we want to make, which is that an element must merge local to the idiom—in this case low in the verb phrase—in order to prevent idiomatic interpretation. We will see below in (17), that location PPs, which are outside the verb phrase, do not seem to be able to prevent idiomatic interpretation at all. Goal Ps, as we see in (7), can.
There may be a preference for the for-adverbial in these cases, however, the time span is not ungrammatical. Essentially these predicates behave both like activities and accomplishments. Note, however, that when a NARC is added, only the time span adverbial is compatible:

(9) a. Juan se comió la paella durante una hora/en una hora
   “Juan ate the paella for an hour/in an hour.”
   Juan NARC ate the paella #for an hour/in an hour
   b. Juan se bebió la cerveza durante una hora/en una hora
   “Juan drank the beer for an hour/in an hour.”
   Juan NARC drank the beers #for an hour/in an hour

Like English goal Ps, the NARC induces telicity. Now consider the Spanish idioms in (10).

(10) a. Juan come la sopa boba.  b. Juan cortó los lazos con Ana
    Juan NARC eats the soup silly  Juan cut the ties with Ana
    Idiomatic meaning: Juan lives off of others.  Idiomatic meaning: Juan broke up with Ana.

Observe in (11) that when the NARC is added, idiomatic interpretation is lost (De Miguel & Fernández Lagunilla 2000), and, since no literal meaning is available, both sentences are odd:

(11) a. # Juan se come la sopa boba  b. # Juan se cortó los lazos con Ana
    Juan NARC eats the soup silly  Juan NARC cut the ties with Ana

Spanish NARCs and English goal Ps pattern together by both inducing telicity and by both preventing idiomatic interpretation. Based on these parallels, we propose the structure in (12), in which the NARC is introduced as the complement of a null goal-like P, which itself merges as a complement of the verb.

(12) [...]vP [vP PP -Ø -GOAL -LIKE NARC]]]]]

One property of this structure is that the null P is low in the verb phrase. This is what allows NARCs to induce telicity and prevent idiomatic interpretation. Consider first the relation between being low in the verb phrase and the ability to induce telicity. Consider the ambiguous location-goal PPs in (13).

(13) a. John carried a bag under the bridge.
   b. John dragged a log behind the barn.

We focus on (13a) in this discussion, although (13b) patterns the same. There are two interpretations consistent with this sentence. There is a goal of motion reading in which John was at a location not under the bridge and then ended up underneath the bridge, carrying the bag the whole time. There is also a located motion reading in which the whole bag-carrying event took place underneath the bridge. Note that the time span adverbial disambiguates for the goal interpretation, illustrated in (14a), and the for-adverbial disambiguates for the location reading, illustrated in (14b).

(14) a. John carried the bag under the bridge in ten minutes.  → goal reading
   b. John carried the bag under the bridge for ten minutes.  → location reading

4 Their example on page 35 is Juan (#se) murió con las botas puestas. (literally “Juan (#himself) died with the boots on”) which only indicates that he had boots on when he died, not the manner in which he died, which is possible without the reflexive. Consider tocarse los huevos “touch one’s eggs”, which on a literal interpretation indicates self-caressing, but which also has an idiomatic interpretation which means “to annoy”. With the double Juan se tocó los huevos a sí mismo only the idiomatic interpretation (“Juan annoyed himself”) is available (Jorge López-Cortina, p.c.).
(14a) illustrates that the goal interpretation and telicity are paired. (14b) illustrates that the location interpretation and atelicity are paired. Now consider evidence for a structural difference between location and goal PPs that comes out in the do so construction in (15).

(15) a. John carried the bag into the store and Frank did so into the church.
b. John carried the bag into the store and Frank did so in the church.

Goal PPs are marked in the do so construction, suggesting that they are low in the verb phrase, whereas location PPs are perfectly fine, suggesting that they merge outside the verb phrase. This structural difference is depicted in the tree in (16).

(16) \[ \ldots vP \\
  vP \quad \text{PP-locations} \\
  v \quad VP \\
  V \quad \text{PP-goals} \]

There is evidence that location PPs are high in the verb phrase and goal PPs are low in the verb phrase. We would like to suggest that location PPs cannot affect telicity because they are high in the verb phrase whereas goal PPs can affect telicity because they are low in the verb phrase. First, note that since Tenny (1987) we have known that external arguments do not contribute to (a)telicity. Moreover, Hay et al. (1999) observe that the CAUSE predicate that introduces external argument causers does not contribute to (a)telicity either. On the other hand, internal arguments, and bare plural complements of goal Ps (MacDonald 2008a,b) can contribute to (a)telicity. In fact, MacDonald (2008a,b) takes these, and other facts, as evidence for an aspectual projection (AspP) between vP and VP; it appears that only elements below AspP can contribute to (a)telicity, while elements above it cannot.

Given these observations, the two-way ambiguity of ambiguous goal-location PPs arguably has a structural source.5 The location interpretation is associated with adjunction to vP and because it is too high, it cannot contribute to telicity. The goal interpretation is associated with being low in the verb phrase and because it is low enough, it can contribute to aspectual interpretation. Now consider these ambiguous goal-location PPs with idioms, in (17).

(17) a. John kicked the bucket under the bridge. → Idiomatic meaning only with location interpretation
b. John spilled the beans under the bridge. → Idiomatic meaning only with location interpretation

Only on a location interpretation do these idioms maintain their idiomatic interpretation. On the goal interpretation no idiomatic interpretation is available. Given the picture in (16), the facts illustrated in (17) are not unexpected, since it has been noted that for an element to prevent idiomatic interpretation, it must merge locally to it (Svenonius 2005). Consequently, we take the ability of the NARC to contribute to telicity and to be able to prevent idiomatic interpretation as evidence that the null goal-like P that introduces it merges low in the verb phrase.

2.2. Third property shared with goal Ps

There is yet another way in which goal Ps and NARCs pattern together. Consider the data in (18).

(18) a. John threw the paper onto the sofa.
b. John rolled the ball into the hole.

5 Tungseth (2005) notes similar data for Norwegian ambiguous goal-location PPs. She suggests that locations are higher up in the verb phrase while goals are lower and relates this to their (lack of) aspectual contributions. To be low in the verb phrase seems to be a necessary, although not a sufficient condition. There is arguably also a property associated with a P that allows it to contribute to the event structure properties of the predicate. See MacDonald (2008b), Mateu (2002), Snyder (1995) for proposals on the nature of this property.
There is an entailment that the paper is on the sofa in (18a) and that the ball is in the hole in (18b). There is a specific spatial relation entailed between the denotation of the direct object and that of the complement of the goal P. A similar entailment can be found with NARCs. Consider the data in (19).

(19) a. Juan abrochó la camisa.  b. Juan se abrochó la camisa.
   “Juan buttoned the shirt.”       “Juan NARC closed the shirt
   Juan closed the shirt

Consider two contexts for the sentence in (19a) in which there is no NARC: first, Juan is wearing the shirt while he is engaged in the buttoning event; and second, the shirt is on a hanger while Juan is buttoning it. Interestingly, when a NARC is added, as in (19b), the sentence can only be uttered felicitously in the first context, in which Juan is wearing the shirt. The shirt must be on Juan while buttoning it. Consider another example in (20).

(20) a. Juan lavó el coche.  b. Juan se lavó el coche.
   “Juan washed the car.”       “Juan NARC washed the car.
   Juan washed the car

Again, there are (at least) two contexts in which it is felicitous to say (20a): first, Juan washed the car himself; and second, John dropped the car off at a carwash to let someone else wash it. When the NARC is added, as in (20b), only the context in which Juan himself washed the car is felicitous. The car must be with Juan.

In each case, a particular spatial relation between the denotation of the direct object and the denotation of the NARC is entailed. Recalling the structure from (12) we can state this generalization in a way that is reminiscent of the entailment in the presence of the goal P, noted for the sentences in (18): A particular spatial relation is entailed between the denotation of the direct object and the denotation of the complement of the null goal-like P. In the presence of a NARC, there is an on/with entailment.

We assume that the null goal-like P introducing the NARC has some property (on/with) which restricts the interpretation of the internal argument to being on/with the denotation of the complement of the P due to a predication relation. Essentiallly, the internal argument functions as a subject of the V-null-PP complex (cf. low applicatives Pylkkänen 2002 & Cuervo 2003), illustrated in (21).

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6 Zagona (1996:447) seems to suggest something similar stating: “aspectual se relates the subject and object arguments...with respect to the[ir] location...at the endpoint of the event. That is, se...expresses a relation of co-location in the eventual structure of the predicate.” She executes this by following Zubizarreta’s (1987) analysis of Romance se as a verbal operator that “forces a predication relation between a VP-internal position and the subject” (486), “such that the object is ‘at’ the subject, for verbs of consumption.” (489).

7 We assume that there is an inalienable possession relation entailed between the subject and the direct object when the NARC is present (see MacDonald 2004 for a discussion). Note that it is not uncommon for languages to treat a certain class of ‘culturally basic possessed items’ as inalienable (Chappell & McGregor 1996). Vergnaud & Zubizarreta (1992) observe that in French car and computer (among others) are treated grammatically as inalienable nouns. They refer to them as ‘extended inalienables’. These all seem to be objects that typically fall within the possessor’s ‘personal sphere’ (Bally 1996). Moreover, there is some variation among speakers of even the same dialect as to whether an object is considered inalienable or not (see Chappell & McGregor 1996 and references therein). For some native speakers of Spanish, el coche is an extended inalienable, for some it is not.

8 Technically, the on/with property can be thought of as a feature on the head of P. Moreover it may just be another expression of the central coincidence relation of Hale & Keyser (1993).
It has been noted that in the presence of NARCs bare noun internal arguments are not allowed (de Miguel & Fernández Lagunilla 2000, Franco & Huidobro 2008, Nishida 1994, Sanz 2000, Strozer 1976, Zagona 1996 and Roselló 2002 for Catalan); this is illustrated in (22).

(22) a. Juan se bebió #(el) vino. 
   Juan NARC drank #(the) wine
   “Juan drank the wine.”

   b. Juan se comió #(la) paella. 
   Juan NARC ate #(the) paella
   “Juan ate the paella.”

Given that the presence of a NARC results in a telic interpretation of the predicate, some authors assume that the restriction on bare nouns is related to the telicity of the predicate induced by the NARC (Nishida 1994, Roselló 2002 for Catalan). This is not a counterintuitive approach given, for example, the fact, known since Verkuyl (1972), that nouns can influence the (a)telicity of a predicate, as in (23).

(23) a. John drank a beer in ten minutes/#for ten minutes.

   b. John drank beer #in ten minutes/for ten minutes.

The NP a beer in (23a) gives rise to a telic interpretation of the predicate because of some aspectual property that it possesses, the exact nature of which is still a debated topic. (See Borer 2005 for quantity, Krifka 1989 for quantizedness, and Verkuyl 1972 for specified quantity of A.) When an NP lacks this property, as the mass noun beer does, the result is an atelic predicate as in (23b). This range of facts might lead one to conclude that it is the aspectual incompatibility of the telicizing NARC with mass (or bare) nouns that is the source of the restriction to non-bare nouns illustrated in (22). There are, however, reasons to conclude otherwise. First, note that the standard aspectual pattern (illustrated in 23) is that the internal argument determines whether the predicate is atelic or telic. Standardly, with these incremental theme verbs (Dowty 1991) the presence of a mass noun gives rise to an atelic predicate, as illustrated in (23b), and not to infelicity, as observed with the NARC in (22). This suggests that the restriction on bare nouns may not be directly related to telicity. Second, and more significant are the properties of the Romanian NARC, some of which are different from the Spanish NARC (MacDonald 2006). One difference is that the Romanian NARC does not induce telicity, as illustrated in (24).

(24) a. Eu (mi-)am mâncat mărul #timp de zece minute. 
   I (NARC-)have eaten apple-the #time of ten minutes
   “I ate the apple for ten minutes.”

   b. Eu (mi-)am spălat mașina timp de zece minute. 
   I (NARC-)have washed car-the time of 10 minutes
   “I washed the car for 10 minutes.”
Observe that independently of the presence of the NARC the predicate in (24a) is telic and the predicate in (24b) is atelic. Nevertheless, in the presence of a NARC, bare nouns are not acceptable, as in (25).

(25) Eu mi-am mâncat #supă/supa  
I NARC-have eaten #soup/soup-the  
“I ate soup/the soup.”

These Romanian facts strongly suggest that the restriction on bare nouns is not directly related to telicity, since Romanian NARCS do not induce telicity. Third, observe that Spanish subjects appear to show the same restriction to non-bare nouns, illustrated in (26-27).

(26) a. La piedra destrozó el coche.  
The stone destroyed the car  
b. #Piedra destrozó el coche.  
Stone destroyed the car

(27) a. El pastel (de manzana) provocó su alergia.  
The cake (of apple) caused his allergy  
b. #Pastel (de manzana) provocó su alergia.  
Cake (of apple) caused his allergy

As noted above, since Tenny (1987) we know that external arguments do not affect the (a)telicity of the predicate. This suggests again that the restriction to non-bare nouns in NARC constructions is not directly related to telicity. Moreover, once we put telicity aside, we have the potential to account for the restriction to non-bare subjects and direct objects with NARCs both, in the same way.

Nishida (1994) observes that only DPs with quantized reference can be direct objects with NARCs. A beer has quantized reference, since the denotation of a beer summed with the denotation of another beer does not fall within the denotation of a beer, but within the denotation of two beers. In contrast, beer does not have quantized reference; it has cumulative reference, since the denotation of beer summed with the denotation of beer does fall within the denotation of beer. We take quantizedness to be the most adequate semantic characterization of the direct object DPs that can occur with NARCs (without exhaustively testing here the range of nouns that can and cannot appear). Moreover, we would like to suggest here that Spanish DP subjects have the same restriction as direct objects with NARCs.

Consider one final example to support this suggestion. In (28) the noun phrase mucha cerveza “much beer” has cumulative reference and is not allowed as a direct object with the NARC, as in (28a), nor as a subject, as in (28b).

(28) a. #Juan se bebió mucha cerveza.  
Juan NARC drank much beer  
b. #Mucha cerveza arruinó su salud.  
“Much beer ruined his health.”

As expected, cumulative direct objects with the Romanian NARC are also disallowed: 11

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9 Although Nishida (1994: 431) refers to them as denoting quantitatively delimited entities.
10 An anonymous reviewer offers the following as a counterexample: Mucha cerveza contiene... “A lot of beer contains...” We agree with these judgements, although note that the interpretation of much cerveza here is akin to la mayoría de la cerveza “the majority of the beer”, which is felicitous with the NARC as well: Juan se bebió la mayoría de la cerveza. This supports the main claim that the restriction on direct objects with NARCs is the same as the restriction on subjects. It does question whether the correct semantic characterization of the (il)licit noun phrases should be made in the mereological terms of quantizedness and cumulativity. Does the denotation of the majority of beer summed with the denotation of the majority of beer fall within the denotation of the majority of beer? It is not so obvious to us, but it is not entirely clear. See Moltmann (1991) and Zucchi & White (2001) for other problems relating to the mereological characterization of noun phrases and their relation to (a)telicity.
11 Krifka (1992) states that not all telic predicates are quantized, but that all quantized predicates are telic. This entails that the mereological notions of quantizedness and cumulativity are not entirely dependent on (a)telicity. Interestingly in the literature on aspect there is often an impression that there is in fact an intimate relation between the two notions. The range of facts above strongly suggests that there is not.
(29) a. #Eu mi-am mâncat multă pizza. b. #Eu mi-am băut multă bere.
    “I have eaten much pizza.” “I have drank much beer.”

We assume that the restriction to quantized DPs is the result of a particular property on the head of the null goal-like \( P \), which we call \([q]\) for quantizedness, illustrated in (30).

![Diagram](image)

Because of the semantic content of \([q]\), in combination with the predication relation established between the V-PP complex and the internal argument, only quantized DPs can appear. Observe in (31) below that since at least Larson (1988) we have known that material in a low merged PP can affect the interpretation of the direct object.

(31) a. Beethoven gave the Fifth Symphony to the world.
    b. Beethoven gave the Fifth Symphony to his parents.

In (31a) the Fifth Symphony is interpreted as an intangible object, while in (31b) it is interpreted as a stack of papers. These differences in interpretation result from differences in the DP complements of the goal Ps. Observe in (32) that by changing the Ps themselves, we also can affect the interpretation of the direct object.

(32) a. John pushed the tree onto the barn.
    b. John pushed the tree into the barn.

Due to the different semantic properties of the goal Ps themselves, there is a difference in the spatial relation between the denotation of the direct objects and the denotation of the DP complements of the Ps. This is what we claim to essentially be happening in the NARC constructions with respect to the restriction to quantized DPs; a property of the \( P \) forces a concrete interpretation on the DP direct object.

Given this featural account, and if we follow Chomsky’s (2000, 2001, 2004) assumptions regarding the EPP/OCC feature, we can straightforwardly extend this proposal to subjects in Spanish. Chomsky (2000, 2001, 2004) assumes that the EPP/OCC feature is not available in all languages, and if available in a language it is optionally present. Assuming that this is a fact about features in general, features are then independent of the projections on which they appear. That is, there appears to be nothing in principle that would restrict the \([q]\) feature to the head of the null goal-like \( P \) alone. In this case, it could appear on little \( v \), for example, and via predication, restrict the external argument to quantized DPs:
We have known since Marantz (1984) that material inside the VP, specifically the internal argument, contributes to the interpretation of the external argument, some examples are listed in (34).

(34) a. John took a bus.   b. John took a break.
c. John took a nap.   d. John took a euro (from my wallet).

Moreover, if we assume, following Folli & Harley (2005), that there are different flavours of v, then we can understand the contrast in (35) as well.

(35) a. The groom ate the wedding cake.
   b. #The sea ate the beach.

The external argument in (35a) is interpreted as agentive. If v is responsible for the agentive interpretation, we can understand why when a non-agentive external argument is present, like the sea in (35b), the sentences is out. This is because the semantic content of v contributes, via predication, to the interpretation of the external argument. This is what we assume is happening with respect to the restriction to quantized DPs in subject position in Spanish; the semantic content of [q] on little v forces a concrete semantic interpretation on the external argument DP.

4. Why non-argumental reflexives do not double

The previous sections have been building up to this final section, where we provide an answer to the question of why these NARC constructions do not allow clitic doubling, as illustrated in (36).

(36) a. Juan se comió la paella (*a sí mismo).
      Juan NARC ate the paella (*to himself self)
      “Juan ate the paella.”
   
   b. Juan se lavó el coche (*a sí mismo).\footnote{This sentence improves for some speakers, but we think it is only on a benefecative interpretation. This comes out in a parallel example from Strozer (1976: 156), \textit{No, me lo lavé a mí mismo} “No, I washed it for myself”, which is the answer to the following question “¿Le lavaste el coche a tu papa? “Did you wash your father’s car?”. Note that, while available for some speakers with \textit{lavar}, this reading is not available in with \textit{comer}.}
      Juan NARC washed the car (*to himself self)
      “He washed the car.”

First, we must note that the inability to double is not directly related to the clitic being a reflexive pronoun per se; for, note that argumental reflexives can double, shown in (37).

(37) a. Juan se afeitó a sí mismo.\footnote{This sentence improves for some speakers, but we think it is only on a benefecative interpretation. This comes out in a parallel example from Strozer (1976: 156), \textit{No, me lo lavé a mí mismo} “No, I washed it for myself”, which is the answer to the following question “¿Le lavaste el coche a tu papa? “Did you wash your father’s car?”. Note that, while available for some speakers with \textit{lavar}, this reading is not available in with \textit{comer}.}
      Juan refl. shaved to himself
      “Juan shaved.”
   
   b. Juan se vió a sí mismo.
      Juan refl. saw to himself
      “Juan saw himself.”

This would lead one to expect that the inability to double is related to the non-argumental status of the reflexive. However, this cannot be the whole story, since non-argumental non-reflexive clitics can double, as illustrated in (38).
These facts seem to indicate that the lack of doubling is related to a combination of factors: first, being reflexive, and second, being non-argumental. Let us uncover what the relevant properties of being reflexive and being non-argumental are such that the combination of the two precludes doubling.

4.1. The non-argumental status of clitics

We first address the nature of clitic non-argumentality. Note that non-argumental non-reflexive clitics (NON-RCs) of Spanish pattern with NARCs in several ways, suggesting that they share the same structural configuration. First, NON-RCs can prevent idiomatic interpretation, illustrated in (39).

(39)

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{(39a).} & \quad \# \text{Juan me cortó los lazos con Ana.} & \quad \# \text{Juan me rompió el hielo en la fiesta.} \\
\text{Juan NON-RC cut the ties with Ana} & \quad \text{Juan NON-RC broke the ice at the party} \\
\text{\#"Juan broke up with Ana (on me)."} & \quad \text{\# "Juan broke the ice at the party (for me)."}
\end{align*}
\]

These sentences do not receive the idiomatic interpretations noted in the translations. This is due to the presence of the NON-RCs. Second, observe that a particular relation between the internal argument and the denotation of the clitic is established, a type of possession relation (see Cuervo 2003 who argues for a low applicative), in (40).

(40)

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{(40a).} & \quad \text{Juan me comió la paella.} & \quad \text{Yo le lavé el coche a él.} \\
\text{Juan NON-RC ate the paella} & \quad \text{I NON-RC washed the car to him.} \\
\text{"Juan ate my paella."} & \quad \text{"I washed his car."}
\end{align*}
\]

In (40a) the paella is interpreted as in the possession of the denotation of *me*, and in (40b) the car as in the possession of the denotation of *le*.

Finally, note that there is also a restriction on the appearance of bare nouns in the presence of NON-RCs as well, illustrated in (41).

(41)

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{(41a).} & \quad \text{Juan me comió la paella.} & \quad \text{Yo le lavé la ropa a él.} \\
\text{Juan NON-RC ate the paella} & \quad \text{I NON-RC washed the clothes to him.} \\
\text{"Juan ate my paella."} & \quad \text{"I washed his clothes."}
\end{align*}
\]

NON-RCs and NARCs share these three properties. We take this to mean that they have essentially the same underlying syntax. The only significant difference is that NON-RCs do not give rise to a telic interpretation of the predicate, while NARCs do. We assume that this is related to a property on the null goal-like P of NARCs, which the null P of NON-RCs lack. Note that in English, while goal Ps have this property, directional Ps lack it; consequently, they do not make atelic predicates telic, shown in (42).

(42)

\[
\text{John carried the bag (toward the barn) \# in ten minutes/for ten minutes.}
\]

More concretely, we assume that NON-RCs are introduced as the complement of a null directional-like P that merges as the complement of the verb (see also MacDonald 2006), as in (43).

\[\text{An anonymous reviewer points out to us that the possession relation is not necessarily entailed in these examples though it is the salient one. We are adopting a loose interpretation of possession relation here, one that includes non-permanent possession, as when, for example, some object is assigned for temporary keep. Thus, my friend could be the title owner of a car, but I could be in possession of it for the weekend. A second reading for (40a) is an ethical dative reading. Note that clitic doubling is not compatible with the ethical dative reading, nor with the temporary assignment reading of (40b). We take this to mean that there is an underlying syntactic difference corresponding to these two readings that precludes doubling. We do not explore this difference here.}

\[\text{Note that if there is no determiner, there is only an ethical dative interpretation, not a possessive interpretation. Thanks to Nerea Madariaga for pointing this out to us.}\]
Consider a positive consequence of this proposal. We can provide an explanation for the independent fact that NON-RCs do not allow secondary adjectival modification, as illustrated in (44).

(44) a. *Maria me$_j$ comió la paella borracho$_j$.  
   Maria NON-RC ate the paella drunk.  
   “Maria ate my paella drunk.”

b. *Maria me$_j$ lavó el coche desnudo$_j$.  
   Maria NON-RC washed the car nude.  
   “Maria washed my car nude.”

Note that this is a fact generally true for all complements of Ps, as illustrated in (46).

(45) a. *John threw the ball toward/to Bill$_j$ drunk$_j$.  
   “John threw the ball toward/to Bill drunk.”

b. *Bill dragged the log toward/to John$_j$ nude$_j$.  
   “Bill dragged the log toward/to John nude.”

Two potential accounts of secondary adjectival modification can be found in Bowers (2000) and Demonte (1999). If we follow Bowers (2000) who assumes that for secondary adjectival modification to hold, a control relation must be established between the NP being modified and a PRO within the secondary predicate, then the data in (44) are evidence that the null directional-like P is too low to control into the secondary predicate. If we follow Demonte (1999), who assumes that an m-command relation must be established for secondary adjectival modification to hold, then the data in (44) are evidence for the existence of the null directional-like P itself, since its presence blocks the necessary m-command relation.

In conclusion, the relevant non-argumental status of these clitics is related to being introduced as a complement of a null P low in the verb phrase. Now let us address the relevant property distinguishing reflexive and non-reflexive clitic doubling.

4.2. Reflexive vs. non-reflexive doubling

We will see that the relevant property differentiating NARC and NON-RC doubling is related to the presence of mismo “self”. Observe below in (46) that mismo is obligatory when a reflexive doubles.

(46) a. Juan se afeitó a sí *(mismo).  
   Juan refl. shaved to himself *(self)  
   “Juan shaved.”

b. Juan se vio a sí *(mismo).  
   Juan refl. saw to himself *(self)  
   “Juan saw himself.”

In contrast, mismo is not obligatory when a non-reflexive doubles, it is optional, as illustrated in (47).

(47) a. Yo le afeité a él (mismo).  
   I NON-RC shaved to him (self)  
   “I shaved him.”

b. Yo le besé a ella (misma).  
   I NON-RC kissed to her (self)  
   “I kissed her.”

Observe, moreover, that when the non-reflexive is non-argumental (i.e. a NON-RC) mismo is no longer optional; in fact, it is ungrammatical, as illustrated in (48).

(48) a. Yo le comí la paella a él (*mismo).  
   I NON-RC ate the paella to him *(self)  
   “I ate his paella.”

b. Yo le lavé el coche a él (*mismo).  
   I NON-RC washed the car to him *(self)  
   “I washed his car.”

---

15 These judgments correspond to Spanish Leista dialects.
Considering the conclusions regarding the nature of the non-argumental status of these (non-) reflexives, the data in (48) suggest that \textit{mismo} cannot appear below a null P, assuming that a double and its associate initially form a constituent (Kayne 2005, Uriagereka 2001, 2005). This explains why NARCs cannot double. Since \textit{mismo} must obligatorily appear with a reflexive when doubled, but \textit{mismo} cannot appear as a complement of a null P, NARCs cannot double. If this is the correct way to understand the lack of doubling, a natural question arises: Why is \textit{mismo} not licensed as the complement of this null P? First, note that \textit{mismo} patterns with adjectives in that it must agree in gender (and number) with its associate. This is illustrated in (49).

(49) a. Él se vió a sí mismo/*a
He refl. saw to self \textit{self-masc/*fem.}

b. Ella se vió a sí misma/*o
She refl. saw to herself \textit{self-fem/*masc.}

“He saw himself”

“She saw herself.”

Concentrating on the gender feature alone, the sentences in (49) also serve to show that \textit{mismo} cannot get its gender feature from \textit{sí}, or \textit{se}, since \textit{sí} and \textit{se} are gender neutral. This means that \textit{mismo} must get its features from the external argument. \textit{Mismo} is not licensed as the complement of a null P because it cannot get its phi-features from the external argument. One possible explanation arises if we assume that this null P is a phase head. Others have proposed that some Ps are phase heads as well (see Raposo 2002, Abels 2003). If \textit{mismo} is below the P head, by the time the external argument merges, \textit{mismo} is no longer accessible, due to the PIC (Chomsky 2001, 2004), since the P phase is closed off. If this is the correct analysis, then the reason why NARCs cannot double is because \textit{mismo} would be sent to the interface with unvalued features and the derivation would crash.

5. Conclusion

In this paper we have addressed several properties of non-argumental reflexive clitic constructions. We have proposed that the clitic itself is the complement of a null goal-like P that merges as the complement of the verb. Features on the null P itself explained some of the properties of these constructions while being low in the verb phrase explained others. Finally, we have argued that these clitics do not double because their double cannot establish the correct relation with the subject to value its phi-features due to the intervening null P.

References


