

Doomed by Design: Structural Implications of the Renewable Fuel Standard for E85 Demand

Jia Zhong^{1,2}, Madhu Khanna^{1,2}, Deepayan Debnath¹

¹DOE Center for Advanced Bioenergy and Bioproducts Innovation, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Urbana, IL

²Department of Agricultural and Consumer Economics, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Urbana, IL

Renewable Fuel Standard

- Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) sought to induce the consumption of high blend rates of ethanol from not only corn but also cellulosic feedstocks.
- Instead, a “blend wall” has emerged and limited the demand for ethanol to 10% of motor gasoline (E10) consumed while higher ethanol blend fuel (E85) is more costly at the energy equivalent basis.
- The current consumption of biofuels in the US has fallen short of the originally proposed RFS mandated volumes. (Fig. 1)
- Two design features of the RFS, specifically, nested structure and cellulosic waiver credit create the pathways of biodiesel overage.
- Compliance with the mandate requires the obligated parties to acquire tradable permits “Renewable Identification Number (RIN)”

Fig. 1 Unintended divergence in RFS compliance (Billion gallon 2017)





Fig. 2 RFS policy structure and different types of RINs



Research Question:

- What are the factors behind the divergence of the RFS compliance?
- What are the implications of design feature of the RFS on the fuel market?
- What are the unintended consequences of the diversion in mandate compliance?

Literature

Mechanism of RFS does not consider blend wall

- Fuel tax and ethanol subsidy (de Gorter and Just, 2010; Lapan and Moschini, 2012; Cui et al., 2011)

Blend wall studies assume complete RIN pass-through

- Price E85 at least parity or lower (Du & Li, 2015; Pouliot and Babcock, 2015)

Empirical evidence about incomplete RIN pass-through

- 0 to 30% RIN passed through to retail E85 price (Knittel and Meiselman, 2016). 50% to 75% of RIN passed through to E85 (Lade and Bushnell, 2018)

Biodiesel overage

- Biodiesel overage in the presence of a binding blend wall with nested structure as marginal compliance fuel (Korting, 2017; Irwin, 2013; Lade, 2016)

Research gap

- Not discussed are the consequences of the divergence in compliance on retail fuel prices of E10 and E85
- Or the rationale behind incomplete RIN pass-through

Partial Equilibrium Conceptual Framework

$$\begin{aligned} \max \text{ Social Welfare} = & \int_0^{q_{gf}} D_{gf}(\cdot) dq_{gf} + \int_0^{q_{df}} D_{df}(\cdot) dq_{df} && \text{Consumer surplus} \\ - & \int_0^{q_e} S_e(\cdot) dq_e - \int_0^{q_c} S_c(\cdot) dq_c - \int_0^{q_b} S_b(\cdot) dq_b - \int_0^{q_g} S_g(\cdot) dq_g - \int_0^{q_d} S_d(\cdot) dq_d && \text{Producer surplus} \\ - & C(q_{gf}, q_{df}) - P_{cw}q_{cw} + t_B q_b && \text{Blending cost, waiver cost, tax credit} \end{aligned}$$

Three Policy scenarios:


1. Nested with the waiver



2. Nested without the waiver:



3. Non-nested



Consumer surplus

Producer surplus

Blending cost, waiver cost, tax credit

D6: Conventional biofuel
D4: Biomass-based diesel
D3: Cellulosic biofuel
W: Cellulosic waiver

Analytical Result

Structural difference in RIN pass-through at blend wall

PROPOSITION 1: Non-nested RFS mandate secures the complete RIN pass-through and prices of E10 and E85 at the energy parity, regardless of biodiesel production.

$$P_{gf}^{E85} - P_{gf}^{E10} = \left(\mu \frac{S_e(\cdot)q_e + S_c(\cdot)q_c + vS_g(\cdot)}{q_e + q_c} \right) - \mu \frac{P_{D6} \times q_e + P_{D3} \times q_c}{q_e + q_c} + v(\lambda_c \theta_c + \lambda_b \theta_b + \lambda_r \theta_r)$$

$$q_{E85} \geq 0 \quad P_{gf}^{E85} = P_{gf}^{E10} \quad \text{Pass-through} = \frac{\text{Net RINs incentive}}{\text{Production cost gap}} = 100\%$$

PROPOSITION 2: Existing biodiesel overage under nested RFS mandate prevents full RIN pass-through from wholesale ethanol to retail E85 resulting in higher E85 price compared to E10.

$$q_{E85} = \frac{-[q_{D4} - \theta_b(q_g + q_d)]}{0.74 - 0.26(\theta_r - \theta_b)} < 0 \quad P_{gf}^{E85} > P_{gf}^{E10} \quad \text{Pass-through} = \frac{\text{Net RINs incentive}}{\text{Production cost gap}} < 100\%$$

Strategic overage hinges on the supply elasticity


PROPOSITION 3: Nested structure stimulates blenders to choose the biodiesel pathway instead of the ethanol pathway to comply with the mandate when elasticity-weighted marginal cost of using biodiesel is lower than corn ethanol

$$\left(\frac{1}{\eta_b} + 1\right) S_b(q_b) < \left(\frac{1}{\eta_e} + 1\right) S_e(q_e)$$


PROPOSITION 4: The provision of a **cellulosic waiver** will lead blenders to further substitute biodiesel for ethanol to meet the total renewable fuel mandate when elasticity-weighted marginal cost of using biodiesel is lowest

$$\left(\frac{1}{\eta_b} + 1\right) S_b(q_b) < \left(\frac{1}{\eta_e} + 1\right) S_e(q_e) < \left(\frac{1}{\eta_c} + 1\right) S_c(q_c)$$


Simulation Results



Design features of the RFS create two pathways of biodiesel loopholes: (1) Backfilling of the cellulosic waiver; (2) Replacing the conventional biofuel



Over-produced biodiesel reduces ethanol RINs values, widens the price spread between E10 and E85, and undermines the RIN pass-through.



The sensitivity analysis validates that the main driver of RIN pass-through is the lower elasticity-weighted marginal cost of biodiesel. The biodiesel tax credit contributes to the biodiesel overage and lower RIN pass-through. The role of cellulosic waiver in affecting the pass-through is limited.

Conclusion and Policy Implication

- The design features of RFS including nested structure and the cellulosic biofuel waiver credit induces biodiesel overage and disincentives to lower E85 price.
- Blending choice hinges on the relative elasticity-weighted marginal costs of corn ethanol, biomass-based diesel, and cellulosic biofuels.
- The unintended consequence of RFS shows that there is loophole within the RFS structural design allowing biomass-based diesel to be overaged.