Contents

List of Figures and Tables  
Acknowledgments  

1 A Constitutional Perspective on House Organization  
2 Constitutional Actors and Intraparty Groups  
   Constitutional Actors  
   Intraparty Groups  
   Identifying Intraparty Groups  
   Majority Intraparty Groups within the Democratic and Republican Parties  
   Conclusion  
3 A Constitutional Theory of Legislative Organization  
   Theories and Models of Lawmaking in the United States  
   The Model: Explaining Changes in House Organization  
   The Power-Sharing Game  
   The Legislative Game  
   Equilibrium Properties  
   Conclusion  
4 Timing of House Organizational Changes  
   Timing of Rule Changes: Current Perspectives  
   Constitutional Actors and the Timing of Rule Changes: Empirical Implications  
   The Model’s Implications for Timing: When Do House Members Adopt New Rules?  
   House Rules: Defining the Universe of Rules and Organizational Changes
## Contents

### Constitutional Actors and the Timing of Rule Changes:
- Empirical Analysis
  - House Rule Changes, 1961
  - House Rule Changes, 1879–2013

### Conclusion

- The Directionality of Rule Changes: Current Perspectives
- Theory: Explaining the Directionality of Rule Changes
  - Centralization of Power – Empowering the Speaker
  - Decentralization of Power – Revolting against One’s Own Leader
  - Decentralization of Power – Empowering Outliers
- Empirical Implications: The Directionality of Rule Changes
- Empirical Analysis: Data and Measurement
  - Measuring the Positions of Constitutional Actors: House Factions, the Senate, and the President
  - Rules and the Distribution of Power within the Majority Party: Coding Centralization and Decentralization of Power in the House

### Analysis

- No Changes in CS
- Change in CS and the Non-Speaker Group Gained an Ally (Allies) in the Senate and/or President (Senate and/or President Closer to the Non-Speaker Faction than to the Speaker)
- Change in CS and Senate and President Move Closer to the Speaker Group (Non-Speaker Group Has No Outside Allies)
- Change in CS and the House Minority Party Gains Control of President and Senate

### Conclusion

6 New Rules for an Old Speaker: Revisiting the 1910 Revolt against Speaker Cannon
- The Revolt against Speaker Cannon
- Prevailing Interpretation of the Revolt
- Is the Prevailing Interpretation Correct?
- Timing of the Revolt: Why Did the Progressives Revolt Only after Cannon Had Been Serving as the Speaker for More Than Six Years?
  - Why Not a Revolt before the 1909 CS Changes?
  - Why Did the Revolt Happen a Year after Taft’s Election?
Contents

Directionality of the Revolt 121
Presidential Change, Policy Differences, and Roll Call Data 123
Alternative Explanation: Cannon Was Most Autocratic during the Year prior to the Revolt 125
Conclusion 126
7 Conclusion 127

Appendix A Constitutional Actors, Partisanship, and House Majority Party Factions 131
Appendix B Theoretical Proof 142
Appendix C List of Changes in the Rules and Procedures of the House 152
Appendix D Universe of Rules and Procedures 157
Appendix E Coding of William H. Taft and Calvin Coolidge Presidencies 159
Appendix F Directionality of Rules and Procedures 162
Appendix G Senate’s Ideal Point 174
Bibliography 177
Index 191