Recent empirical legal scholarship on the consumer bankruptcy system has uncovered a marked rise in the proportion of elder Americans filing for relief under the Bankruptcy Code. But these studies have not probed the reasons behind that rise, an omission this Article seeks to address. Professor John Pottow and colleagues recently assembled the new dataset of the Consumer Bankruptcy Project (CBP), the largest national sample of consumer debtors in this country, which he uses to explore the sources of elder bankruptcy. The findings are both striking and ominous. While multiple factors, such as health problems and medical debts, contribute to elders’ financial distress, the dominant force appears to be overwhelming burdens related to credit cards. Elder debtors carry fifty percent more credit card debt than younger debtors, and they cite credit card interest and fees as a reason for their bankruptcy filings fifty percent more frequently, results that are highly statistically significant. Professor Pottow uses further survey and court record data from the CBP to explore why elders rely upon credit cards more than their younger counterparts. Finally, Professor Pottow addresses the current Bankruptcy Code, noting that it is both a theoretical and doctrinal mismatch for elder debtors, and proposes possible reforms.

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Recent empirical scholarship on the consumer bankruptcy system has documented a marked rise in the proportion of elder Americans filing for relief under the Bankruptcy Code.\(^1\) Although somewhat modest in absolute percentages (7.0%)\(^2\) and still beneath their proportionate level of the general population (12.4%),\(^3\) the rate of increase of this demographic within the ranks of the bankrupt has been striking. This Article uses the dataset of the Consumer Bankruptcy Project (CBP), assembled in 2007, to explore the conditions of these elder filers.\(^4\) Although teasing causation out of cross-sectional data is a perilous task,\(^5\) the hope is that analysis of some of the unique characteristics of these elder debtors will shed light on the underlying puzzle: why are elder Americans filing for bankruptcy at such an alarmingly increasing rate? The data suggest a phenomenon driven largely, although not exclusively, by credit cards. For example, credit card interest and fees are the most cited reason for filing bankruptcy by elders, with two-thirds of elder debtors specifically invoking this reason, substantially more than the half of younger debtors who do so. Findings also reveal that the median elder debtor in bankruptcy carries fifty percent more credit card debt

\(^1\) See, e.g., Deborah Thorne, Elizabeth Warren & Teresa A. Sullivan, The Increasing Vulnerability of Older Americans: Evidence from the Bankruptcy Court, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 87 (2009).

\(^2\) See id. at 97.


\(^4\) The Consumer Bankruptcy Project (CBP) is a multi-institutional consortium of which I am a co-principal investigator. Funding for the CBP was provided in part by grants from the American Association of Retired Persons, the Harvard Law School, the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, the University of Michigan Office of Vice President for Research, and the University of Michigan Law School. The co-principal investigators of the CBP are: David U. Himmelstein, Professor of Public Health, City University of New York; Melissa B. Jacoby, George R. Ward Professor of Law, University of North Carolina School of Law; Robert M. Lawless, Professor of Law and Galowich-Huizenga Faculty Scholar, University of Illinois College of Law; Angela K. Littwin, Assistant Professor of Law, University of Texas School of Law; Katherine M. Porter, Professor of Law, University of Iowa College of Law; Teresa A. Sullivan, President, University of Virginia; Déborah K. Thorne, Associate Professor, Ohio University; Elizabeth Warren, Leo Gottlieb Professor of Law, Harvard Law School; and Steffie Woolhandler, Professor of Public Health, City University of New York.

than the median younger filer. After presenting these data, this Article briefly considers current bankruptcy law and policy, noting how poorly suited the Bankruptcy Code is to assist those elder Americans whose financial distress has brought them to seek relief in the courts.

I. The Swelling Ranks of Elder Bankruptcy Filers

Bankruptcy filers are getting older. The median age of a filer was 36.5 in 1991, which increased to 40.6 in 2001, and increased again to 43.0 by 2007. Moreover, the number of elder filers has risen quickly. As first reported in our findings published in 2008, CBP data show the number of bankruptcy filers age sixty-five and over doubled from 2.1% in 1991 to 4.5% in 2001. This trend persisted in 2007 as the proportion of filers in this age group rose further to 7.0%. (See Table 1.) Indeed, the age sixty-five-and-over cohort is the fastest growing age demographic within the CBP sample.

6. See Thorne et al., supra note 1, at 93 fig.1. The median age of the general population was 36.1 for 2007, an imperfectly comparable number given that children traditionally do not file bankruptcy but are included in the general population count. Id.

7. “Filers” comprise the co-petitioning spouse in a joint petitioner bankruptcy. (Married couples may, but need not, file joint petitions.) Thus, in reporting our age findings, we count a bankruptcy filing as “elder” if either the primary or co-petitioning debtor is age sixty-five or over in the case of joint petitions. (We obviously also count all single petitions where the petitioner is age sixty-five or over.) Note that this will actually undercount the number of elder Americans affected by bankruptcy filings, because we miss the cases in our count where there is a married petitioner under age sixty-five who files a single petition but is married to a spouse who is age sixty-five or over.
These findings on the greying of the bankruptcy population are consistent with other studies. For example, in a study of 24,038 applicants for credit counseling (a necessary prerequisite to filing bankruptcy), the Institute for Financial Literacy reported that 7.8% of applicants were age sixty-five or over. Similarly, an Administrative Office of the United States Court (AO) statistician and analyst reported that the median age of a bankruptcy filer had risen from 37.7 in 1994 to 41.4 by 2002. Another recently released AO paper found the number of peti-

8. LESLIE E. LINFIELD, INST. FOR FIN. LITERACY, AGING AND BANKRUPTCY: ARE OLDER AMERICANS TRULY AFFORDED AN ECONOMIC FRESH START? 7–8 (2007); accord Ed Flynn & Gordon Bermant, Bankruptcy by the Numbers: Filers Most Likely in 25–44 Age Range, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Dec. 2001/Jan. 2002, at 28, 29 (finding that of 1931 no-asset Chapter 7 cases that were closed in 2000, 6.5% of the debtors were age sixty and over).

9. John Golmant & Tom Ulrich, Bankruptcy by the Numbers: Aging and Bankruptcy – The Baby Boomers Meet Up at the Bankruptcy Court, AM. BANKR. INST. J., May
tioners age sixty-five and over to be 7.4%.\textsuperscript{10} Smaller scale bankruptcy studies have reached similar results.\textsuperscript{11} According to general population research, the growing elder financial distress does not seem confined to bankruptcy.\textsuperscript{12} Indeed, this greying phenomenon also seems to have hit other countries.\textsuperscript{13} The run-up in elder bankruptcy filings, thus, may well be part of a broader social trend. All that is known for certain at this point is that the trend of rising elder bankruptcies is pronounced and persistent. The challenge for scholars is to try to understand why it is so.

II. Scrutinizing Elder Debtors: The Consumer Bankruptcy Project

The initial data in the previous section reporting the age of bankruptcy filers were gathered from the CBP, a multi-institutional consortium of scholars from various disciplines, including law, medicine, and sociology.\textsuperscript{14} Methodological summaries of the CBP's research protocols have been published in varying degrees of detail elsewhere, so only the briefest of summaries follows.\textsuperscript{15} The CBP is the first national sampling of consumer bankruptcy filers after the Bankruptcy

2007, at 26, 27. The authors report their age cut-off at fifty-five, and so while one cannot compare CBP data directly, they do seem consistent. Id.

10. See John Golmant & James A. Woods, Aging and Bankruptcy Revisited, AM.
BANKR. INST. J., Sept. 2010, at 34, 74.

11. See, e.g., Ed Flynn & Gordon Bermant, Bankruptcy by the Numbers: A Closer Look at Elderly Chapter 7 Debtors, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Apr. 2002, at 22, 22 (estimating 4.4% of no-asset, non-business Chapter 7 cases closed from 1998–2000 were filed by petitioners age seventy or older).


Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA).\(^{16}\)

Our core dataset constitutes approximately 2500 questionnaires returned from filers in all U.S. judicial districts from a period in early 2007. Extensive coding of the bankruptcy court filings of questionnaire respondents was also added to this dataset. Finally, a subset of 1000 of the respondents completed in-depth telephone interviews with trained researchers. Thousands of pieces of data were collected on over a thousand bankruptcy filers, including through telephone interviews. By examining these court records and surveys, the CBP dataset allows rich insights into the many Americans facing financial distress who find need to seek relief in the bankruptcy courts.\(^{17}\)

Because our previous research already indicated a notable rise in elder Americans filing for relief, we augmented our CBP core sampling of randomly selected debtors with a deliberate oversample of debtors age sixty-five and older. Again, detailed elaboration of the process we used to find the ages of these filers is available elsewhere.\(^{18}\)

To summarize, through a process of age estimation (age is not listed on the court records), the CBP was able to target an additional 192 bankruptcy filers throughout the surveyed districts where the primary or secondary petitioner was age sixty-five or over. Combined with the core sample, this yielded a dataset of hundreds of elder bankruptcy filers (one of the largest such sets to date).\(^{19}\)

The richness of the CBP dataset allows us to study with greater nuance why elder Americans might be filing for bankruptcy at such an increasing rate. Most previous studies rely upon the court records alone, which allows only limited insight beyond the identity of creditors and amount owed.\(^{20}\) For example, one such earlier study sug-
gests credit card debt plays a large role in elder filings but is left to concede with frustration, “Unfortunately, the bankruptcy petitions [on their own] do not reveal much about how this debt was incurred. We have no information regarding how the credit cards were used—e.g., for medical debt, living expenses, luxury items, gambling, etc.”

The CBP’s dataset builds upon these prior court record efforts by supplementing publicly available data with rich details from self-reporting. This allows examination of these issues in greater depth, the results of which are reported in this Article.

III. Credit Cards Causing Elder Filings

A. Self-Report Metric from Questionnaire

The simplest way to discover why people file for bankruptcy is to ask them. The CBP questionnaire has just such a question, providing a non-exclusive choice of answers from which respondents can pick. The non-exclusive choice format means debtors can pick more than one reason. In reporting the data below, I include any respondent who cites the “credit card” reason, whether it was the exclusive explanation for the filing or whether it was one of several others, such as a medical reason. Here is where one finds the first and most important datapoint: the elder filers most frequently selected credit

Bermant studies. Flynn & Bermant, supra note 8; Flynn & Bermant, supra note 11; Flynn & Bermant, infra note 21.


23. One choice from the menu of non-exclusive reasons was “Interest and fees on credit cards were overwhelming.”

24. This methodological decision reflects a preference at the margin for clarity over nuance. For example, as a more nuanced test, I could have cross-referenced the open-ended narrative question that respondents were invited to complete to expand on their bankruptcy filing experience to assess whether, for example, credit cards were the “driving purpose” of the filing, but I preferred the bright-line clarity of the cruder approach. I also considered including only respondents who cited credit card reasons alone when responding to the reason-for-filing question; I rejected that approach based on the considerable number of respondents who cited more than one reason from this non-exclusive list. Ultimately, I am interested in how many people feel credit cards played at least “a part”—indeed, a part significant enough for them to self-report in reflecting on causal forces—in their collapse into bankruptcy.
cards—more specifically, the fees and interest rates on their credit cards—in explaining why they went bankrupt. Of the elder debtors, 66.6% reported credit cards as a reason for filing. Not only was this the most frequently cited reason (followed by “medical reasons”), but elder debtors chose “credit cards” as an explanatory reason more frequently than younger debtors to a statistically significant degree. (Only 53.3% of younger debtors cited credit card reasons, p < 0.01.) (See Figure 1.) Thus, two-thirds of elder Americans who filed for bankruptcy ascribed credit cards as a reason for their downfall. This finding accords with the implication of earlier U.S. studies and studies from other countries. (“Implication” is used because most of these studies were unable to report the debtors’ self-ascribed reasons for filing.)

25. Although not similarly worded, and although drawn from a different population (credit counseling applicants), the data from the Institute for Financial Literacy are somewhat similar. “Overextended on credit” was cited by 62.8% of applicants (more than any other reason given) as a cause of financial distress. LINFIELD, supra note 8, at 13. Similarly, a study of Canadian debtors over age fifty-five found “overextension of credit” as the most frequently listed primary cause of bankruptcy and that that reason increases in likelihood as a function of the debtor’s age. See Sarra, supra note 13, at 801–02.

26. These numbers continue the rising trend of elder credit card debt. For example, in the 2002 Flynn and Bermant study (based on no-asset, non-business Chapter 7 filings from 1998–2000), the authors estimate $24,360 in median bank credit card debt for age-reporting filers age seventy or over (vs. $10,587 median credit card debt for younger filers) plus an additional $2233 in median store credit card debt (vs. $1035 median store credit card debt for younger filers). See Flynn & Bermant, supra note 11, at 22, 49 tbl.2. Similarly, a related study published in 2004 (based on data from no-asset, non-business Chapter 7 filings from 2000 to 2002) estimates that “average” credit card debt for age-reporting filers age sixty-five or over was $27,787—the highest of any other age demographic—although the measurements used are not directly comparable. See Flynn & Bermant, supra note 21, at 74 tbl.4. A third study from 2003 (based on no-asset, non-business Chapter 7 filings from 2000) estimates $35,917 in mean credit card debt for age-reporting filers age sixty or more. See Flynn & Bermant, supra note 8, at 4.

27. See Sarra, supra note 13, at 798–99 (finding that while overall debt decreases as a function of age of Canadian debtors over age fifty-five, credit card debt by contrast increases).
FIGURE 1
Credit Card Interest and Fees Cited as Reason for Filing Bankruptcy, by Age

![Credit Card Interest and Fees Cited as Reason for Filing Bankruptcy, by Age](chart)

Source: Author's calculation of 2007 CBP data. (p<0.01)

B. Credit Card Trends from Court Records

In addition to measuring the effect of credit card debt through self-ascription as reported above, the CBP also coded court records for incidence of credit card debt, in part to share methodology with prior studies. Even though it was used as a method in prior studies, coding court records proved difficult given the ambiguities in creditor identification. Recognizing these ambiguities, the CBP employed two concentric definitions of credit card debt, loosely corresponding to “definitely” credit card debt and “probably” credit card debt, based on the identity of the scheduled creditor. 28 Both definitions showed stark

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28 A debt was considered “definitely” credit card debt if the listing on Schedule F of the bankruptcy petition contained the words “credit card,” “card,” “revolving credit,” “charge account,” or closely similar terms. Also, any listing that contained brand name words for a credit card such as “Visa,” “Mastercard,” or “Discover” was counted as definitely credit card debt. Debts were considered “probably” credit card debt if the listing on Schedule F contained the name of one of the top ten credit card issuers at the end of 2006 (Bank of America, JP Morgan Chase, Citigroup, American Express, Capital One, Morgan Stanley (Discover), HSBC Holdings, Washington Mutual, Wells Fargo, U.S. Bancorp), even if the listing did not contain words like “credit card” or a brand name like “Visa.” Debts
differences by age. For debtors who held at least some credit card debt, younger filers had a median of $13,615 in definite credit card debt and $15,499 in combined definite and probable credit card debt, contrasted with elder debtors, who had a median of $22,562 in definite and $27,213 in combined definite and probable credit card debt, highly significant differences under either metric (p < 0.001 for each).29 (See Figure 2.) The court record data are thus consistent with the questionnaire results showing credit cards as the engine for elder filings.30 Indeed, not only do elder bankruptcy filers have more credit card debt than younger filers, they carry substantially higher balances than their non-bankrupt age group cohorts in the general population.31 In sum, elder debtors are not just growing in number, but they seem to have more credit card debts and cite credit card problems as their reason for filing bankruptcy more frequently than any other age group.

were also considered probably credit card debt if they used the terms “line of credit,” “revolving loan,” or “personal loan” in the Schedule F description.

29. For elder debtors, the means were $33,995 for definite and $37,076 for combined definite and probable, and for younger debtors, the means were $22,775 for definite and $25,267 for combined definite and probable (p < 0.001 for each). Considering only the subset of debtor who answered that they filed bankruptcy due to overwhelming interest and fees on credit cards, the differences show the same pattern: elder debtors had a median of $28,075 (mean $29,239) for definite and $31,622 (mean $43,201) for combined definite and probable credit card debt, and younger debtors had median of $19,034 (mean $27,885) for definite and $22,024 (mean $31,112) combined definite and probable credit card debt. These median differences also were highly significant: p < 0.001 for definite and p < 0.001 for combined definite and probable (p < 0.001 for each mean).

30. The Flynn and Bermant series of studies all show this disproportionate trend, with credit card debt rising as a function of age. See Flynn & Bermant, supra note 8; Flynn & Bermant, supra note 11; Flynn & Bermant, supra note 21. The 2002 paper shows the over-age-sixty cohort as holding five times as much credit card debt as filers under age twenty-five and that the credit card debt constituted over seventy-five percent of general unsecured debt. Flynn & Bermant, supra note 8, at 28–29. The 2004 paper estimates it at four times as much (using age sixty-five as a cutoff). Flynn & Bermant, supra note 21, at 74.

IV. Why Credit Cards for Elder Debtors?

Finding that elder filers are disproportionately citing overwhelming interest and fees on credit cards as reasons for filing bankruptcy and carrying such high credit card balances invites speculation over why this is so. That is, if we assume credit cards are not marketed disproportionately to people age sixty-five and over, then it must be something about the debtors themselves that makes them rely inordinately upon credit cards, and to their own peril. As one prior study laments in discussing another’s finding that credit card debt amongst elder debtors who file Chapter 7 bankruptcy seems to be
growing the fastest, “No explanation is given as to why the older debtors incurred the most credit card debt . . . .”32 Researchers, however, are now starting to try. For example, a project conducted by the National Consumer Law Center has gathered some qualitative data on the rise in elder credit card debt generally.33 Consequently, the time is ripe to use survey data on bankruptcy filers to enhance our understanding of this unsettling trend.

There are several possible reasons why we might expect to see elder borrowers particularly drawn to credit cards. First, credit card reliance could stem from incompetence or lack of sophistication. Cognitive and other frailties might lead elder borrowers to fall victim to what some have called the “tricks and traps” model of consumer credit card lending, becoming lost in the dizzying barrage of small print contractual provisions that others may be able to parse with greater sophistication.34 Alternatively, the difference could stem from strategy or profligacy. It could be that elder debtors are more cunning than their younger peers, knowing that they can load up profligate expenses on credit cards and then discharge these unsecured debts in a bankruptcy filing. A third possible reason could be anonymity or covering. It could be that elder borrowers are drawn to the quasi-secrecy that credit card borrowing accords: debtors with a revolving credit balance are able to borrow (albeit it at a comparatively expensive rate) by running a balance without telling their families or friends. Still another possibility is social or financial isolation. Per-

32. Golmant & Ulrich, supra note 9, at 53–54.
34. Regulatory Restructuring: Enhancing Consumer Financial Products Regulation: Before the H. Comm. on Financial Serv., 111th Cong. (2009) (statement of Elizabeth Warren, Chair, Cong. Oversight Panel) (explaining that “giant lenders ‘compete’ for business by talking about nominal interest rates, free gifts, and warm feelings, but the fine print hides the things that really rake in the cash. Today’s business model is about making money through tricks and traps.”); see also NCLC PART ONE, supra note 33, at 6 (reporting legal services director in West Virginia describing the “very low” level of financial sophistication of clients, especially elderly women: “some of them still think there are debtors’ prisons”.

haps bankrupt elders are relying on credit cards more than others simply because they do not have access to alternative forms of credit and are using cards as funds of last resort. This list of four possible reasons—incompetence/unsophistication, strategy/profligacy, anonymity/covering, or social/financial isolation—does not purport to be comprehensive, and surely some reasons are capable of overlapping with others. Fortunately, the survey instruments of the CBP allow us to report further findings that engage some of these conjectures. They are now reported, as categorized by these possible explanatory hypotheses.

A. Incompetence/Unsophistication

Self-report instruments present challenges in assessing mental competence. The question, “Are you too incompetent to handle your own credit cards?” is unlikely to generate reliable data (although, to be sure, the respondents of our surveys cover a range of highly personal subject matter with what is believed to be a strong level of candor).\(^{35}\) Direct data of age effects on financial competence are thus difficult to gather, at least through self-report methodologies like surveys. That said, some creative researchers have made strides using alternative designs. One recent study, for example, analyzes credit reports and credit card usage patterns to conclude that financial acuity peaks in middle age and then declines in the senior years,\(^ {36}\) and another uses a financial literacy test module for the University of Michigan’s 2008 Health and Retirement Study to find diminishing literacy by age (on a dismal baseline).\(^ {37}\) But direct self-report data remain a tall order. The CBP’s methodology, however, does allow us to glean insight from indirect measures of financial competence.

35. See, e.g., Himmelstein et al., supra note 22.
36. See SUMIT AGARWAL ET AL., THE AGE OF REASON: FINANCIAL DECISIONS OVER THE LIFE CYCLE WITH IMPLICATIONS FOR REGULATION 51(2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=973590 (finding elder—and younger—credit card users made more “mistakes,” such as paying higher credit card fees and interest rates than they were otherwise required under the circumstances, than middle-aged users).
As an example of an indirect measure of financial competence, one question on the CBP questionnaire asked debtors whether being “tricked by creditors” was a reason for filing bankruptcy. The data do not reveal an age effect: 15.0% of younger filers indicated they filed because they felt they had been tricked by creditors, which was in fact slightly more (but not significantly so statistically) than the 11.3% of elder filers who so answered.

Perhaps a better approach than measuring “competence” might be to gauge what could be called debtor financial “sophistication.” On the CBP questionnaire, debtors were asked whether before bankruptcy they requested creditors to work with them on their payments, which is a plausible proxy for financial sophistication (or at least fortitude). Here, we do see elder respondents diverge from their younger counterparts. For elders, only 37.8% replied yes, they had asked their creditors to work with them, which was statistically significantly lower than the 60.0% of younger filers who did so (p < 0.01). (See Figure 3.)

38. We also asked debtors if they had attempted to consolidate their debt. Of filers who had at least one credit card, 36.3% of younger filers replied that they did, compared with 30.7% of elder filers, a difference that was statistically significant (p < 0.026). For all debtors, 34.4% of young filers and 30.0% of elder filers attempted to consolidate their debt, a difference that was not statistically significant. Interestingly, while more than half of the elder debtors reported being contacted by debt collectors (58.0%), that number was significantly lower than the younger debtors who had been so contacted (84.5%) (p < 0.001). Perhaps it is the need to respond to the hectoring of debt collectors that prompts younger debtors to initiate negotiation discussions. This interpretation might paint debt collectors as serving a salutary function of prompting discussion. On the other hand, by several metrics, the elder respondents were less likely than their younger counterparts to cite pressure from debt collectors as a reason for filing. For example, only 34.9% of elder written questionnaire respondents cited pressure from debt collectors as a reason for filing, compared with 47.6% of their younger counterparts, a difference that is highly significant (p < 0.001). Additionally, 55.8% of elder phone survey respondents reported that pressure from debt collectors was either very much or somewhat a reason for filing, compared with 79.6% of younger filers (p < 0.001).
Thus, one sees some data, albeit indirect, suggesting elder debtors who end up in bankruptcy are just not as sophisticated financially as their younger peers in terms of negotiating with creditors. But the most striking difference along age lines in this area is the number of credit cards bankrupt elders held. In the two years before filing for bankruptcy, 18.2% of younger debtors held no credit cards, while only 10.3% of elder debtors had none. Even more strikingly, 32.4% of younger debtors held five or more credit cards, while 44.8% of elder debtors held that many. 39 (See Figure 4.)

39. Significance: p < 0.01 for no credit cards; p < 0.001 for five or more cards, on proportion distribution (prtest).
Again, one must be cautious in interpreting these data. If drowning in an excessive number of credit cards reveals a lack of financial sophistication, then these data contribute another indicator suggesting bankrupt elders may be less sophisticated financially. On the other hand, an opposite narrative is plausible: that the large number of credit cards held by elder debtors reveals their adroit ability to juggle numerous cards, transferring balances from one to the other with high sophistication. The proper inference cannot be conclusively determined, which is why triangulation with other data is necessary. Given that in the self-report questionnaire, more bankrupt elders blame credit card interest and fees as the source of their demise than any other reason, it is likely the multiplicity of cards shows less, not more, financial sophistication.

### B. Strategy/Profligacy

Many have opined that credit cards accord special opportunity for abuse by allowing consumers the chance to run up large balances—constrained only by minimum monthly payments and account limits—with unsecured loans that are generally capable of complete

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**FIGURE 4**

Credit Card Penetration, by Age

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Had No Credit Cards</th>
<th>Held Five or More Credit Cards</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Under 65</strong></td>
<td><strong>65 and Over</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N=162)</td>
<td>(N=289)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18.2 (p&lt;0.01)</td>
<td>32.4 (p&lt;0.001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>44.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s calculation of 2007 CBP
discharge in bankruptcy. Could it be that the elder group’s disproportionate self-report of credit card bankruptcies reveals a generational difference in profligate spending? At the outset, the irony of this possibility should be noted, as some previous studies addressing bankruptcy stigma rely upon age as a proxy for positive moral character. Could elders have less shame and hence be more willing to exploit credit cards?

The debate on the role of stigma in bankruptcy is as well rehearsed and lengthy as the discussion of its methodological challenges. The CBP nevertheless attempted some direct measure of bankruptcy stigma by asking respondents the degree of embarrassment they had associated with their filings. Those results show not only a robust continued role of bankruptcy’s stigma, but no appreciable age difference. Filers of all ages reported being mortified at having had to file: 50.9% of elder filers and 52.1% of younger filers reported being “very much” embarrassed to file, and an additional 29.5% of elder filers and 30.5% of younger filers reported being “somewhat” embarrassed to file. Thus, the elders were equally embarrassed, just as they reported being equally “scared” at having to file: 53.5% of elder filers and 56.1% of younger filers reported being “very much” scared to file, and 28.7% of elder filers and 29.7% of younger filers reported being “somewhat scared” to file (See Figure 5.) Even trying to proxy for other signs of profligacy, one is still unable to support an inference that elder debtors are more morally lax


41. E.g., F.H. Buckley & Margaret Brinig, The Bankruptcy Puzzle, 27 J. LEGAL STUd. 187, 200-05 (1998). How empirically supported this assumption is remains questionable. Indeed, one recent survey found that seventy-three percent of respondents age sixty-five or over characterized a television as a “necessity” compared with fifty-three percent of respondents aged eighteen to twenty-nine. See PEW RESEARCH CTR., LUXURY OR NECESSITY? THINGS WE CAN’T LIVE WITHOUT: THE LIST HAS GROWN IN THE PAST DECADE 11 (2007).


43. Similarly, 88.9% of young respondents and 87.3% of elder respondents reported being “relieved” at filing. Interestingly, the relief seemed to provide bigger respite for the elder debtors: while “only” 62.3% of elder respondents reported being currently stressed about their finances (at the time of their telephone interviews, i.e., well after they filed for bankruptcy relief), 72.1% of the younger filers were already stressed again.
than others. They seem to purchase lottery tickets and frequent casinos at the same rate as their younger cohorts in bankruptcy. Indeed, the debtors sampled in the CBP as a whole do not seem to indulge in these free-spending pastimes any more often than their non-bankrupt peers. One might be inclined to conclude that such data would help retire the “loose morals” myth regarding the typical bankruptcy debtor, but such myth is likely to prove long-lived. Consequently, the increased credit card usage of elder debtors does not seem part of a grand scheme of age-dependent fraud.

44. The elder response rates to these questions mirror the CBP population responses as a whole. See infra note 45.
45. About half visited casinos in the past year, the same as in the Detroit Area Household Financial Services Study (a study of moderate- and low-income general households in the Detroit area), although this comparison should perhaps be qualified by Detroit’s geographic proximity to numerous casinos. For an overview of this study, see Michael Barr, Detroit Area Study on Financial Services (Overview), http://www-personal.umich.edu/~msbarr/detroit_area_study.html (last visited Apr. 19, 2011). Additionally, 56.5% did not buy lottery tickets in the year before their bankruptcy, 24.2% did so a few times per year, 7.7% did so about once a month, 9.0% did so about once a week, and only 2.7% did so almost daily.
46. The Canadian study of bankruptcy filers over age fifty-five found ninety-eight percent reported that it was difficult to tell family and friends about their filing, some discussing at length their feelings of shame, fear and humiliation. See Sarra, supra note 13, at 810.
Note the deliberate conflation of two related but analytically distinct grounds for reliance on credit cards in this discussion of strategy and profligacy. The first is invidious conduct: strategic behavior and the concomitant immunity from shame revealed by use of credit cards with no intention to repay. Here we see no age differences in the reported instrument measures trying to proxy for shamelessness. The second ground is what might be better considered “morally lazy” conduct: profligate use of credit cards, not because of premeditated financial fraud, but because of impulse control shortcomings. Assuming, only arguendo, that credit card balances serve as a proxy for profligate spending, then perhaps elder people have more difficulty controlling their spending urges than younger debtors.

Without getting sidetracked on whether such a trait is more properly classified as a value-neutral “competence” problem (and hence belongs in the previous section’s discussion on sophistication) or as a value-laden “personal failing” (and hence properly belongs in
this discussion of strategic and profligate conduct), I simply present the apposite data from the CBP. One of the self-reported reasons for filing bankruptcy that respondents could specifically choose was “problems controlling spending.” Over a quarter of the debtors sampled by the CBP admitted that this was at least one of their problems leading to the need to file bankruptcy. This was not the most frequently selected reason, or even one of the top five reasons, but the considerable number of people admitting that self-control issues caused financial failure ought to dampen fears of a self-serving bias amongst respondents. This question, ironically, is one area where the elder respondents diverged from their younger colleagues: whereas almost a third of younger respondents (28.6%) cited spending control problems as a reason for filing bankruptcy, less than a quarter (22.6%) of the elder respondents did so (p < 0.02). (See Figure 6.) Accordingly, reliance on credit cards seems less linked to spendthrift conduct with elder debtors, suggesting other causal factors must be at work in explaining the elder credit card phenomenon.

47. Far from suggesting personal weakness or laziness, the overwhelming majority of respondents felt filing bankruptcy was “the responsible thing to do.” In fact, elder respondents reported “struggling” with their debts before filing bankruptcy for a shorter period of time than younger debtors (30.0% vs. 40.0% (p < 0.01)), which, coupled with the high rate of elder debtors who believed filing was the responsible decision, could lead to the conclusion that the elder debtors were quicker to own up to failure and take what was perceived as the responsible path.

C. Anonymity/Covering

Another possibility for increased reliance on credit cards by elder debtors is the inherent anonymity of the credit product. Unlike a traditional bank loan that requires sitting down with a banker, or a lifeline from a family member that requires an awkward conversation, revolving credit card balances are effectively at the election of the borrower. Up to the credit limit, the debtor can charge daily consumption items in times of cash flow shortfall without turning to external sources for help. Why might this be of relevance to elder borrowers? Sociologists have for some time noted that elder persons are especially disinclined to seek help for a complex variety of reasons. For example, Elizabeth Moen describes the “non-acceptor syndrome,” and finds that “the elderly are quite reluctant to seek or accept help.”

She further finds that this disinclination to seek assistance varies as a function of the degree it requires the person to make an acknowledgment of failure, such that “assistance or services perceived as earned or available to all elderly are the most acceptable, while those that require a public declaration of poverty are the least acceptable.”

A leading sociology authority similarly concludes: “Because of personal pride and a desire to remain independent, many elderly people hide financial problems, even from their own families.”

Qualitative data confirm these assessments, and many of the elder debtors articulated this sentiment in the phone interviews. As one elder debtor captured it, “I didn’t want people to know we filed bankruptcy, because they would look at me a different way. To this day, nobody knows. I thought it was a loser that had to do that.” These sociological observations suggest that the attraction of credit cards may indeed be heightened for elder consumers in financial distress, and the data from the CBP lend some support.

In response to the question of how comfortable they would be borrowing money from family and friends, fewer than a quarter of the elder CBP respondents answered that they would be somewhat or very comfortable (23.1%), whereas more than a third of younger respondents (36.1%) would be somewhat or very comfortable (p < 0.001). This in turn may explain why when asked how they coped with their financial distress before filing for bankruptcy, the elders again “underperformed” their younger debtor colleagues in asking friends and family for assistance, by 35.2% to 68.7%—less than half as likely to do so (p < 0.001). Similarly, only 2.9% of elder debtors tried to cope by asking for help from charities or churches, compared with 10.8% of younger debtors (p < 0.001). (See Figure 7.)

Finally, and perversely, not only do the elder debtors appear disproportionately loath to ask for assistance from others—perhaps preferring the secrecy of the credit card—they also disproportionately try to help other family members facing their own financial problems. One of the reasons for filing bankruptcy respondents could choose on the CBP questionnaire was “tried to help family/friends.” Elder deb-

50. Id. at 302.
51. JOHN J. MACIONIS, SOCIOLOGY 405 (11th ed. 2007).
52. See generally NCLC PART TWO, supra note 33, passim (reporting on, inter alia, field interviews with elder assistance programs and clients).
tors listed this as a cause in 22.3% of cases; younger filers only did so for 15.9% (p < 0.002). In fact, in the interview portion of the phone survey, several elder debtors expressed frustration at their decisions to help family. One debtor said she was angry “that our kids could make us get into that situation,” and another said he was angry because “I felt very betrayed by my sons.”

**FIGURE 7**

*Asking for Help, by Age*

![Graph showing the percentage of elders asking for help, by age group.](image)

Source: Author’s calculation of 2007 CBP data.

**D. Social/Financial Isolation**

The data in the previous section suggest that bankrupt elders might be drawn to credit cards in order to avoid asking people for help as a way of coping with financial distress. This in turn raises

53. Anonymous interview with Debtor E.451D (date of interview on file in project archive).
54. Anonymous interview with Debtor E.195R (date of interview on file in project archive).
55. Anonymous interview with Debtor E.072O (date of interview on file in project archive).
another question: is the disinclination to ask for help animated by psychosocial preference, or is it compelled by lack of access to a support network? In other words, it could be that elder debtors would be delighted to ask for help, but they simply have fewer supporters to seek out (or, more precisely, fewer financially relevant supporters to seek out). Again, the CBP findings shed light. Apart from the question of how comfortable debtors would be asking for financial help from family or friends, a separate question asked, “Could you borrow from family and friends if needed?” While two-thirds of younger debtors responded that they could (66.3%), substantially fewer elders (57.7%) said they could, a difference that is statistically significant (p < 0.01). (See Figure 8.) Perhaps relatedly, the demographic information on the CBP bankrupt population shows them as less likely to be married and more likely to be divorced than the general population.

56. This qualification is added because these findings cannot distinguish between elders who lack support networks altogether (have no friends/family) and elders who have emotional support networks but lack financial support networks (have family/friends, but who are themselves all tapped out financially).
57. In the Canadian study of bankruptcy filers over age fifty-five, seventy-four percent said it would have been helpful if they could have talked to someone about their financial problems prior to filing bankruptcy. See Sarra, supra note 13, at 811.
58. The general population data show approximately fifty-four percent of people are married (compared with forty-four percent of CBP debtors) and approximately nine percent are divorced (compared with twenty-five percent of CBP debtors). Interestingly, about three in ten individuals age sixty-five and older in both the general population and the CBP pool were widowed. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, AMERICA’S FAMILIES AND LIVING ARRANGEMENTS: 2006 tbl.A1 (2006), available at http://www.census.gov/population/www/socdemo/hh-fam/cps2006.html.
When asked questions specifically designed to uncover whether they were using credit cards to hide debts from otherwise available-to-help families and friends, however, the respondents’ age did not reveal meaningful differences. For example, when asked whether they were worried they would be a burden on family or friends if they discussed their financial problems, both elder and younger debtors were equally split regarding their concern. Similarly, when asked whether they thought revealing financial distress would make family members doubt the debtors’ financial abilities, respondents showed no discernible differences based on age (with about half worrying about this). Thus, it is not clear whether the reliance on credit cards

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59. It is of course impossible to exclude denial as an explanation for the elder response rates.

60. Fifty-four percent of elder debtors were somewhat or strongly in agreement, compared with sixty-two percent of younger debtors (ns).

61. Fifty-five percent of elder debtors were somewhat or strongly in agreement, compared with fifty-four percent of younger debtors (ns). This was apparently a false worry on behalf of the respondents: elder debtors reported less harm to family relationships as a result of filing than younger debtors. In response to a question whether family relationships were damaged by the bankruptcy filing, 12.0% of elder debtors reported damage while 20.7% of younger debtors reported damage, a difference that is statistically significant (p < 0.05).
is animated by secrecy or simply because credit cards are the easiest form of accessible credit.

One is, therefore, hesitant to overstate the findings of social isolation. Yes, it does seem that the elder bankruptcy debtors have fewer resources, but that could simply be compounding a pre-existing problem of secrecy—or pride—alluded to in the previous section. It is one thing to find that elder debtors are no more worried than younger debtors regarding assessments of their competence in revealing their financial distress to others. That does not suggest heightened reliance on credit cards to hide debts from family. But it is quite another to find that the elder debtors are less likely than younger ones to turn to charities and churches, which surely do not discriminate based on age. That reluctance does suggest an attitudinal mechanism at work—possibly resulting from stubbornness, pride, denial, or a different repayment ethic. The data thus reveal the complexity of the issue; certainly more than one force is at work.

V. Elder Financial Collapse: Funding a Structural Deficit?

The descriptive financial data of the elder debtors suggest that they are poorer than other bankruptcy filers. Although bankruptcy filers on the whole are poorer than the general population (having lower incomes, higher debt loads, etc.), the elder filers are disproportionately poorer than the younger filers—the poorest of the poor. The monthly income of the elder debtors is lower than that of the younger ones, taking into account all sources of income, with a difference that is statistically significant (highly so): $2304 for the younger

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62 One interesting finding from the Canadian study was that some elder filers reported “loneliness” as a reason for taking up economically destructive activities (e.g., gambling), which forty percent attributed as playing a causal role in their bankruptcies. See Sarra, supra note 13, at 810.

63 Sullivan et al., supra note 42, at 222.

64 Life-cycle consumption enthusiasts will be quick to point out that elders “should” be poorer (more precisely, that their comparative impecunity is not troubling), because they have fewer consumption needs. That is, of course, true to a point but does not help answer the question why the elder bankruptcy ranks are swelling. It could be that the elder debtors, while having fewer consumption needs, are falling below an income floor required to meet even those lower needs and hence are turning to credit cards maladaptively for income supplementation.
debtors compared with $1940 for the elder debtors (p < 0.001).65
While elder debtors have lower monthly incomes than younger debtors, their total unsecured debt is about the same. The median unsecured debt owed by elder debtors is $33,270, while the median owed by younger debtors is $32,723, underscoring the important role that credit card debt must be playing in elders’ unsecured debt loads.66
Finally, as a distress ratio, the median elder unsecured debt-to-income ratio is 1.5 (mean 2.2), while the median younger debt-to-income ratio is 1.2 (mean 2.0), a difference that was highly statistically significant.67
This finding of comparative poorness raises the issue of covariance: the fact that we see elder debtors carrying more credit card debt and blaming credit cards for filing bankruptcy more than their younger cohorts could be a function of their comparatively poorer position. Thus, age could be a co-variate of “poor” such that either factor predicts credit-card-based reasons for filing bankruptcy. A logit regression, however, shows that the probability of filing bankruptcy due to overwhelming interest and fees on credit cards increases if one is elderly, even when controlling for income.68 This suggests that there is something about age qua age, not just age as a proxy for poorness, at work.
Background data on employment motivations augment the view that these elder debtors in bankruptcy are in tough economic straits.69
A little more than one-third of elder CBP filers reported that they had retired but then returned to the workforce.70 When asked why they

65. Means: elder = $2248; younger = $2640, p < 0.001. The median total assets for younger filers was $50,885, compared with $43,511 for the elders—lower, but not statistically significant in light of the wide dispersion of asset levels. Means: elder = $89,265; younger = $102,369, ns.
67. Note that one study actually finds credit card debt increases with income. See Flynn & Bermant, supra note 21, at 20 (finding a discontinuous “jump” at zero income to higher levels of credit card debt).
68. Controlling for assets did not change the logit findings, an unsurprising result given that assets were insignificantly correlated with age. See supra note 65.
69. See Clare Ansberry, Elderly Emerge as a New Class of Workers—and the Jobless, WALL ST. J., Feb. 23, 2009, at A1 (reporting rising trend of elders needing to return to or remain in the workforce to make ends meet).
70. Although one might expect many elders to be retired, twenty-three percent responded that they coped with their financial problems before bankruptcy by looking for more work. In addition, almost fifty percent of elders selected “loss of income” as a reason for filing bankruptcy (although this was fewer than the younger debtors who did so).
were working or seeking employment, only 35.9% reported it was for love of work; 74.4% candidly admitted it was because they needed money to cover everyday expenses; and 18.0% explicitly said it was to earn money to pay for health care and medical expenses, with 15.4% also saying it was to get health insurance benefits. Going back to work seems a necessity for many of these elder debtors, and the qualitative interview data reflect that it is not easy. As one debtor lamented, “It’s hard out here at seventy-one trying to make a living. Hope you don’t have to file bankruptcy at seventy-one and still try to work.”

These findings further support the concern that the swelling ranks of elder Americans filing bankruptcy are running out of money, and the picture is not pretty for those that do. For example, 9.7% report having gone without food while struggling before bankruptcy, 31.2% report being late on rent or mortgage, 31.2% report going without required medication (47.1% for the subset who filed bankruptcy for medical reasons), and 21.2% report skipping doctors’ appointments (30.6% for the subset who filed for medical reasons). Thus, one of the most sobering findings of the CBP data may be this stark fact: although all bankrupt debtors are in tough financial straits, the elder filers are in incredibly tough straits—an ominous portent of what may await the baby boomers. Whether this relates to the esca-
lating costs of health care is certainly a possibility, as is the prospect that the abolition of the defined-benefit pension plan plays a role.

It may also simply be the financial shock of retirement itself that elder Americans are ill-suited to face. Recent data show credit counseling applicants citing “retirement” as a cause of financial distress among 5.4% of respondents. Given only 9.4% of respondents categorized themselves as retired, this suggests that retirement has required pre-bankruptcy credit counseling for more than half of retirees. Further exploration of these conjectures must await future study. The relevant observation for now is that credit cards may be a short-term (and ultimately unsuccessful) financing solution for the elder debtors to a structural financial deficit. If Americans cannot live out their senior years, even with Medicare, on their current incomes without relying on credit cards and then going bankrupt, the


77. The National Consumer Law Center styles retirement as a “trigger” or “shock” that can push elder consumers barely managing their credit card minimum payments “over the edge.” NCLC PART ONE, supra note 33, at 8.

78. LINFIELD, supra note 8, at 14.

79. Id. at 10–11.

80. One encouraging finding is that elder respondents reported better results on whether bankruptcy helped them. For example, “only” 33.1% of elder filers said they were currently (i.e., at the time of their phone interviews, well after they filed bankruptcy) still struggling with bills, as opposed to an astonishing 54.2% of younger filers. Still, “only” is in quotation marks, because it is equally sobering that one-third of “fresh start” elders with a bankruptcy discharge are still struggling with bills. As for medical bills, 40.7% responded they were still having trouble with medical bills after bankruptcy, which was actually better than the 59.6% of younger respondents (but still higher than the general level of those struggling for their age group).
findings of this study may provide early evidence of a deep societal problem of overindebtedness.  

VI. Beyond Credit Cards: Medical Bankruptcy and Elder Americans

The CBP data on elder debtors suggest a strong and increasing role of credit cards in bankruptcy filings, which may reveal a number of influences at work. The large role of credit cards, however, should not eclipse other reasons for the run-up in elder bankruptcies, such as medical causes. The subject of medical bankruptcies has been addressed elsewhere, including in earlier reports of the CBP data, and Congress has already held hearings on the matter. A brief detour into this domain seems appropriate, however, because the senior...
population may be taking a disproportionate hit from medical bankruptcies. For example, 59.1% of elder respondents to the CBP survey said that they changed their lifestyles before bankruptcy to help afford medical bills (significantly more than the 47.9% of younger filers).

Defining “medical bankruptcy” is an issue that has prompted both scholarly and political debate that is unnecessary to revisit here. Briefly stated, prior studies using the CBP data employ an aggregate approach to defining medical bankruptcy. For example, the clearest instance of a medical bankruptcy would be if someone selected “health reasons” as one of the choices on the self-report questionnaire as a reason for filing. But one might additionally define a medical bankruptcy as one where a debtor had more than a threshold amount of debt in medical bills (e.g., $5000), or had more than a certain percentage of his or her income in medical debt (e.g., over ten percent). Another question in the CBP instrument asks homeowners whether they had to mortgage their houses to cover medical bills. Researchers might also code affirmative responses to this question as a “medical bankruptcy,” even if, in the debtor’s mind, he or she went bankrupt because of mortgage foreclosure. Accordingly, it is possible to think of “narrower” and “broader” definitions of a medical bankruptcy: there is no intrinsically correct one.

Taking a narrow approach—debtors who specifically responded that a medical reason for them or their spouse led to bankruptcy—elder filers answered affirmatively in 39.1% of cases (significantly more than the 31.2% of younger debtors (p < 0.002)). Similarly, 32.6% of elder filers specifically cited medical bills as a cause for filing bankruptcy.

84. Even though the number of elders was significantly lower than the number of younger debtors answering affirmatively (p < 0.01), almost fifty percent selected “loss of income” as a reason for filing bankruptcy.
86. Jacoby et al., supra note 82, at 397–98 (finding similar response rates from 1999: 46.7% of elder debtors and between 20 to 35% of younger debtors (depending on the age group)). Caution should be used in directly comparing these figures due to methodological differences, though the numbers do seem close enough to offer at least rough confirmation.
(compared with 28.9% for younger debtors).\textsuperscript{87} (These numbers are not cumulative, so someone could answer “yes” to both questions.) On another measure, 30.2\% of elder filers spent more than $5000, or ten percent of their annual household income, on out-of-pocket medical bills. These numbers employing a narrower metric suggest that medical bankruptcies are an important reason for elders’ filings, but not as significant as credit cards. On the other hand, taking a broader definition (matching prior scholarly studies),\textsuperscript{88} where a debtor selecting any one of these alternative metrics of medical bankruptcy qualifies, the data show 67.3\% of elder filers could be linked to a medical bankruptcy—a number almost exactly the same as the amount who cite credit cards.

The point of reporting these data of medical bankruptcies is not to weigh in on the debate whether a narrower measure (say, the 39\% who simply self-report a reason for filing as “medical”) or a broader measure (say, the 67\% who meet any definition) is more appropriate. Rather, it is to underscore that medical bankruptcies are highly prevalent in the rapidly growing ranks of elder filers. This stark reality holds true for a demographic cohort that is supposed to have near-universal health insurance coverage through the Medicare program (and is consistent with surveys conducted outside the bankruptcy realm).\textsuperscript{89} Indeed, 40\% of the elder filers in the CBP reported that it was “very much” or “somewhat” difficult to pay their Medicare premiums and copays.

More important for this Article’s focus on credit cards is the fact that we have no perfect way of disaggregating a medical “versus” a credit card bankruptcy, as conceded by authors of earlier studies.\textsuperscript{90} Indeed, as the previously reported data on credit cards reveal, one reason elder debtors may be relying on credit cards is because they need financing to cover everyday consumption expenses. Thus, there

\textsuperscript{87} This comparison was not statistically significant, perhaps suggesting the medical problems translate more into lost work or more indirect problems rather than straight unpaid medical bills for elders.

\textsuperscript{88} E.g., Himmelstein et al., supra note 5, at 743.

\textsuperscript{89} See DRAUT ET AL., supra note 74, at 10 tbl.2 (reporting that twenty-nine percent of low- and middle-income households surveyed cited illness or necessary medical expenses as contributing to their current credit card balance).

\textsuperscript{90} See, e.g., Flynn & Bermant, supra note 21, at 74 n.4 (qualifying rudimentary estimation of medical debt).
is no absolute way of knowing whether a credit card bankruptcy is or is not also a medical bankruptcy. Although some initial research is unfolding, much more needs to be done. All our data indicate for sure is that both credit cards and medical issues are important—the most important—determinants of elder bankruptcy filings.

VII. Discussion

Although the preceding data on elder debtors present a variety of findings pointing in somewhat different directions, some trends have emerged. At the outset, we saw that elder debtors cite the interest and fees on credit cards as a reason for filing in a strong majority of the cases (over two-thirds), reporting this reason with much greater frequency than younger filers. In analyzing the elder group’s disproportionate use of credit cards, we found no evidence that it is fueled by comparatively greater social shamelessness; elders reported feeling embarrassed and reluctant to file bankruptcy in similar proportions to everyone else. We also found that elder debtors have more credit cards than the younger filers, suggesting that a greater number of credit cards may pose an increased risk of these credit-card-related bankruptcies. As for why there is so much (deleterious) reliance on credit cards, the findings become more complex. On the one hand, the data show some hesitancy by elder debtors to take an assertive role in ne-


92. See id. at 268–71 (analyzing medical bankruptcy data meticulously and reconciling lower reported Schedule F medical expenses with significantly higher spending on medical bills); see also CINDY ZELDIN & MARK RUKAVINA, BORROWING TO STAY HEALTHY: HOW CREDIT CARD DEBT IS RELATED TO MEDICAL EXPENSES 4 (2007) (estimating $6800 in medical expenses for credit card borrowers over age sixty-five).

93. We also unearthed a pernicious effect of financial distress on health: nearly two-thirds (66.3%) of respondents—of all age groups—reported that the stress of their bankruptcies made an existing physical or psychological health problem worse. This seems consistent with available medical evidence. See Melissa B. Jacoby, Does Indebtedness Influence Health? A Preliminary Inquiry, 30 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 560, 563–64 (2002); see also Patricia Drentea & Paul J. Lavrakas, Over the Limit: The Association Among Health, Race and Debt, 50 SOC. SCI. & MED. 517 (2000). Note too that the National Consumer Law Center’s interviews found that “[c]ounselors repeatedly identified medical cost assistance as one essential approach to reduce the debt problems of elder clients.” NCLC PART TWO, supra note 33, at 15.
gotiating with their creditors, perhaps suggesting that they are more passive and less sophisticated than younger debtors. They also feel disproportionately uncomfortable asking family, friends, or even charities for assistance in facing financial distress. On the other hand, the findings do not show age differences in fears of perception; both young and old alike are equally worried about what others will think if they admit their financial distress.

These results suggest that at least part of the elder debtors’ reliance on credit cards may be a disinclination to seek help from others. They also suggest that this disinclination may be fueled by psychosocial forces driving seniors toward more anonymous forms of financing like the credit card, as well as, if not even more by, the lack of a support network for financial help in the first place. Furthermore, the findings of the comparatively worse financial circumstances of elder debtors imply a two-pronged attack hitting elder Americans who fall into severe financial distress: first, they have fewer economic resources to weather these downturns, having lower (and presumably more fixed) incomes than their younger peers; and second, they have a diminished financial support network to turn to for help in times of need, having fewer family and friends that they can ask for assistance. With these socio-economic handicaps, it is unsurprising that credit cards are turned to with such frequency. Finally, and perhaps relatedly, one should consider the finding of highly prevalent “medical bankruptcies” for elder debtors, either at similar or higher rates than younger bankruptcy filers. With so many elder debtors citing medical reasons for filing bankruptcy and with the ability to charge medical expenses to credit cards, one cannot exclude the possibility that a substantial portion of these apparent “credit card bankruptcies” are additionally (or fundamentally) “medical bankruptcies.”

The CBP data analyzed in this Article have allowed considerable insight into the circumstances of the rapidly growing ranks of elder bankruptcy filers. This raises the question whether the Bankruptcy Code is well equipped to handle these elders’ need for financial relief. Sadly, the answer is negative.

The initial problem is conceptual. The theoretical structure of the famous “fresh start” in the U.S. consumer bankruptcy system centers on stripping debtors of all but a barebones set of exempt assets
while allowing them to keep unfettered access to their future income, thus incentivizing them to return to work and social productivity.\footnote{94}{This, of course, is subject to debate, but it is at least one non-contentious narrative of the policy underlining the income-focused fresh start in the U.S. Code. See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird, A World Without Bankruptcy, 50 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 173, 178 (1987) (“Freeing a debtor’s future earnings provides incentives to bring the assets into being in the first instance . . . .”). Baird also notes, however, that “there may be little difference between taking $20,000 from the debtor’s bank account and allowing him to enjoy $50,000 a year income on the one hand, and taking nothing from the bank account and garnishing $10,000 of his wages each year for two years on the other.” Id. at 178.}

The model is based upon future earnings as the key to rehabilitation: in exchange for the bankruptcy discharge, your creditors take away most of your assets, but you get to keep your future income intact and eventually start to re-accumulate savings and rebuild your life.\footnote{95}{See, e.g., Thorne et al., supra note 1, at 88 (“Younger people may well have another thirty years or more in the workforce after their bankruptcy filings, years in which they can rebuild retirement accounts, pay off mortgages, set aside some savings, and otherwise reestablish their financial security.”). Recent theoretical treatment of this conceptualization from an economics perspective can be found in an interesting working paper by Michelle White. Michelle J. White, Personal Bankruptcy: Insurance, Work Effort, Opportunism and the Efficiency of the ‘Fresh Start’ (May 2005) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author), available at http://weber.ucsd.edu/~miwhite/bankruptcy-theory-white.pdf.}

The problem with elder filers is two-fold: first, they have less time to rebuild earnings (admittedly while having less time to consume); and second, they are at a diminished income-earning point in their work-lives.\footnote{96}{This does not even consider the requirement that a Chapter 13 debtor requires “regular income.” 11 U.S.C. § 109(e) (2006).}

Retirees or near-retirees are supposed to rely upon accumulated savings, not future income, to support themselves. Retirement income is notoriously flat to boot. The bankruptcy system’s parsimonious treatment of savings and its pre-occupation with future income is poorly suited to an elder debtor. Indeed, the quintessential asset exemption of “tools of the trade” seems of limited financial help to a retiree.\footnote{97}{11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(6) (2006). The homestead exemption might provide more help to elder debtors if we assume that they are more likely to have accrued equity in their homes by paying off mortgages over time. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(1). General population data, however, show an increasing number of elder Americans still carrying mortgages on their homes. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, AMERICAN HOUSING SURVEY, tbl3-15 (2007), available at http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/housing/ahs/ahs07/ahs07.html.}

Paradoxically, the Code does try to accommodate this disconnect by exempting retirement assets from creditor liquidation, which
would seem to respond to the concern that non-workforce debtors need to be able to keep their savings to fund retirement. The problem, however, is that the data suggest retirement accounts are a luxury of the rich, which means that their protection is of little benefit to the median bankrupt debtor. The CBP data collected on the retirement account assets scheduled in debtors’ petitions found that the median debtor reported no assets in his or her retirement accounts. In fact, even the seventy-fifth percent quartile (i.e., the top twenty-five percent when ranking by amount of retirement assets scheduled) reported only $300 in total retirement savings. This contrasts with the general population, where the Survey of Consumer Finances 2007 data indicate that 52.6% of the population has at least some money in a retirement account. Accordingly, the Bankruptcy Code’s aspiration of rehabilitating debtors based on sheltering future income and current retirement assets seems more optimistic than effective—most of these people have spent down their retirement savings already, assuming they even had any to begin with.

VIII. Recommendations

So what can be done? If future income protection and retirement asset exemption are insufficient to meet the needs of the rising ranks of seniors filing for bankruptcy, what can the law do? Possible solutions exist both inside and outside the bankruptcy system. Using the Bankruptcy Code, the law could target the specific financial problems faced by elder debtors. For example, the restrictions on discharging credit card debt could be relaxed (which would reverse BAPCPA’s

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seemingly misguided innovation of increasing their severity).\footnote{101} Similarly, recent congressional reform targeting medical bankruptcies for streamlined treatment could be followed, which again would reduce the burden on the increasing number of elder debtors.\footnote{102} A more creative idea might be to offer age-specific relief, which many jurisdictions do in according elder residents lower tax rates.\footnote{103} Indeed, several states have exemption laws that are expressly age-specific.\footnote{104} Perhaps recognition of the limited earning potential of elder debtors militates in favor of higher property exemptions for their age group.\footnote{105} There are myriad possibilities creative minds can envision.

These are all useful devices for within-bankruptcy reform, but the most striking findings of this analysis have been the hopelessness of the elder debtor. If seniors have fewer friends to turn to for help with financial distress, it seems difficult to mandate by legislation more friends. Rather, the underlying causes of the financial distress need redress.\footnote{106} Thus, if, for example, medical bankruptcies are sink-
ing elder debtors, then perhaps reforming the health care system is a more efficacious social intervention. Similarly, if reliance on credit cards is driven by insufficient support networks, then maybe public lending programs, such as the United Kingdom’s “Social Fund,” could provide some relief (even if limited to seniors to conserve resources).108 Finally, education and outreach would serve twin functions both of impressing upon seniors the importance of seeking out assistance when needed—asking for help in a context where sociologists theorize such asking is a difficult task—as well as warning them of the deleterious effects of the credit card as a financing vehicle to backstop current consumption shortfalls (the “cement life raft”).109

While this may require a change in legislative direction, some winds do seem to be shifting.110 On an optimistic note, perhaps increased use of the debit card—a payment device toward which elders exhibit some skepticism—might be an easy intervention to achieve.111


109. Elizabeth Warren & Amelia Warren Tyagi, The Two-Income Trap: Why Middle Class Mothers & Fathers Are Going Broke (With Surprising Solutions That Will Change Our Children’s Future) 123–62 (2003). See, e.g., Illegal Garnishment Prevention Act, H.R. 3366, 111th Cong. (2009). Although Social Security benefits are not subject to garnishment or attachment in bankruptcy, many financial institutions nevertheless garnish these deposited benefits on behalf of creditors. H.R. 3366 § 2(a). This proposed bill would have prohibited funds made available to the Secretary of Treasury or the Commissioner of Social Security from being used to promote or encourage direct deposit of Social Security benefits until the Secretary of Treasury promulgated rules protecting these funds from garnishment. H.R. 3366 § 2(b).

110. See Ron Borzekowski, Elizabeth K. Kiser & Ahmed Shaista, Consumers’ Use of Debit Cards: Patterns, Preferences, and Price Response, 40 J. Money, Credit & Banking 149, 155 tbl.2 (2008) (reporting only twenty percent of checking account owners age sixty-five or older made even occasional use of a debit card).
IX. Conclusion

Whether policymakers choose to engage any of these possible reforms remains to be seen. Increasing numbers of elder Americans are falling into the financial ruin of bankruptcy, and data from the CBP suggest that that phenomenon is linked not just to medical causes, but the growing use—indeed, disproportionate use—of credit cards that carry overwhelming interest and fees. Further data from the CBP suggest that this reliance on credit cards may stem more from a reluctance to ask for help than a desire to build up unsecured debt strategically. While the reluctance to seek help may come from sociological factors unique to seniors, it may also come from the sheer lack of anyone from whom to ask for help—in the face of an environment where a rising number of debtors cannot meet their everyday expenses on their incomes. If this last case is true, then this increase in elder bankruptcy filings is the canary in the coal mine, warning of problems that will become even worse as the baby boom cohort enters these income-restricted and support-network-deteriorating senior years. This may require reconsidering the level of public support guaranteed retired members of society—a political question much too daunting to undertake in the scope of this Article reporting bankruptcy data, but a difficult question society will ultimately be unable to avoid.

112. Note that it is the fees and interest specifically on the credit cards that are problematic, which suggests another outlet for policy intervention. Congress seems to have taken up this mantle with encouraging speed. See, e.g., Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-24, 123 Stat. 1734 (2009); Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).

113. As noted in an early work from our project, the deteriorating lot of the elder debtor cohort could have a “trickle down” effect on younger filers too—baby boomers who hoped to turn to their parents for help in times of financial need. See Thorne et al., supra note 1, at 88.
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