

Mixed-monotone Theory for Verification of Autonomous System

Saber Jafarpour



University of Colorado **Boulder**

April 8, 2024

Safety-critical Autonomous Systems

Introduction

Energy/power systems



Air mobility



Autonomous driving



Manufacturing



Transportation systems



Agriculture

Safety-critical Autonomous Systems

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Energy/power systems



Air mobility



Autonomous driving



Manufacturing



Transportation systems



Agriculture

An important goal (Safe Autonomy)

Perform their tasks while ensuring **safety** and **robustness** of the system.

Learning-enabled Autonomous Systems

Motivations and Success Stories

In this talk: Autonomous systems with learning-enabled components

Learning-enabled Autonomous Systems

Motivations and Success Stories

In this talk: Autonomous systems with learning-enabled components

Machine learning is a driving force for developments in autonomous systems

Learning-enabled Autonomous Systems

Motivations and Success Stories

In this talk: Autonomous systems with learning-enabled components

Machine learning is a driving force for developments in autonomous systems

- availability of data and computation tools
- performance and efficiency

Learning-enabled Autonomous Systems

Motivations and Success Stories

In this talk: Autonomous systems with learning-enabled components

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- availability of data and computation tools
- performance and efficiency

Success stories and potential applications



NVIDIA self driving car



Amazon fulfillment centers



Manufacturing

Learning-enabled Autonomous Systems

Safety Assurance as a Challenge

But can we ensure their safety?




Tesla Slams Right Into Overturned Truck While on Autopilot

Robot accident at Amazon warehouse renews safety debate

Written by [Fotake Dostu](#)
Published on Dec. 18, 2018



Waymo driverless car strikes bicyclist in San Francisco, causes minor injuries




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
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What is different with Learning-based components?



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- limited guarantee in their design




Image credit: MIT CSAIL

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MIT
Technology
Review

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE

The way we train AI is fundamentally flawed

The process used to build most of the machine-learning models we use today can't tell if they will work in the real world or not—and that's a problem.

By Will Douglas Heaven

November 18, 2020

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
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- limited guarantee in their design
- large # of parameters with nonlinearity



$$478 \times 100 \times 100 \times 10$$

of parameters ~ 90000
of activation patterns $\sim 10^{60}$

Learning-enabled Autonomous Systems

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
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
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Rigorous and **computationally efficient** methods for safety assurance

ML focus on safety and robustness of **stand-alone** learning algorithms




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Different approaches:

- analysis ([Goodfellow et al., 2015](#), [Zhang et al., 2019](#), [Fazlyab et al., 2023](#))
- design ([Papernot et al., 2016](#), [Carlini and Wagner, 2017](#), [Madry et al., 2018](#))

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


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In autonomous systems, learning algorithms are **a part of the system**
(controller, motion planner, obstacle detection)

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
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New challenges arises when learning algorithms are used **in-the-loop**


Example: Safety in Mobile Robots

In-the-loop vs. stand-alone

Perception-based Obstacle Avoidance



In-the-loop




trained **offline** using images

Stand-alone


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
Stand-alone

- **stand-alone**: estimation of states using learning algorithm
- **in-the-loop**: closed-loop system avoid the obstacle


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In-the-loop



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Stand-alone

- **stand-alone**: estimation of states using learning algorithm
- **in-the-loop**: closed-loop system avoid the obstacle

In-the-loop: how the autonomous system perform with the learning algorithm as a part of it.

Learning-enabled Autonomous Systems

Safety from a reachability perspective

Ensure safety of the autonomous system with learning algorithms **in-the-loop**

Learning-enabled Autonomous Systems

Safety from a reachability perspective

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
Safety of autonomous system using **reachability analysis**

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
Reachability analysis estimates the evolution of the autonomous system

Learning-enabled Autonomous Systems

Safety from a reachability perspective

Ensure safety of the autonomous system with learning algorithms **in-the-loop**

Safety of autonomous system using **reachability analysis**



Reachability analysis estimates the evolution of the autonomous system

In this talk:

- 1 control-theoretic tools for efficient and scalable reachability
- 2 applications to safety assurance of learning-enabled systems

- Reachability Analysis
- Monotone System Theory
- Neural Network Controlled Systems



Reachability Analysis of Systems

Problem Statement

System : $\dot{x} = f(x, w)$

State : $x \in \mathbb{R}^n$

Uncertainty : $w \in \mathcal{W} \subseteq \mathbb{R}^m$



What are the possible states of the system at time T ?



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What are the possible states of the system at time T ?

- **T -reachable sets** characterize evolution of the system

$$\mathcal{R}_f(T, \mathcal{X}_0, \mathcal{W}) = \{x_w(T) \mid x_w(\cdot) \text{ is a traj for some } w(\cdot) \in \mathcal{W} \text{ with } x_0 \in \mathcal{X}_0\}$$

Reachability Analysis of Systems

Safety verification via T -reachable sets


A large number of **safety specifications** can be represented using T -reachable sets

Reachability Analysis of Systems


Safety verification via T -reachable sets

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- Example: Reach-avoid problem



$$\mathcal{R}_f(T, \mathcal{X}_0, \mathcal{W}) \cap \text{Unsafe set} = \emptyset$$





$$\mathcal{R}_f(T_{\text{final}}, \mathcal{X}_0, \mathcal{W}) \subseteq \text{Target set}$$

Reachability Analysis of Systems

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Combining different instantiation of Reach-avoid problem \implies
diverse range of specifications
(complex planning using logics, invariance, stability)

Reachability Analysis of Systems

Why is it difficult?

Computing the T -reachable sets are computationally challenging

Reachability Analysis of Systems

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Computing the T -reachable sets are computationally challenging

Solution: over-approximations of reachable sets

Over-approximation: $\mathcal{R}_f(T, \mathcal{X}_0, \mathcal{W}) \subseteq \overline{\mathcal{R}}_f(T, \mathcal{X}_0, \mathcal{W})$


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
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


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Reachability Analysis of Systems



Applications

Autonomous Driving:




Althoff, 2014

Power grids:





Chen and Dominguez-Garcia, 2016

Robot-assisted Surgery:



Drug Delivery:



Chen, Dutta, and Sankaranarayanan, 2017

Reachability of dynamical system is an old problem: \sim 1980

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Different approaches for approximating reachable sets

- Linear, and piecewise linear systems (Ellipsoidal methods) ([Kurzanski and Varaiya, 2000](#))
- Optimization-based approaches (Hamilton-Jacobi, Level-set method) ([Bansal et al., 2017](#), [Mitchell et al., 2002](#), [Herbert et al., 2021](#))
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Most of the classical reachability approaches are computationally heavy and not scalable to large-size systems

In this talk: use control-theoretic tools to develop scalable and computationally efficient approaches for reachability

- Reachability Analysis
- Monotone System Theory
- Neural Network Controlled Systems

Monotone Dynamical Systems

Definition and Characterization

A dynamical system $\dot{x} = f(x, w)$ is monotone if

$$x_u(0) \leq y_w(0) \quad \text{and} \quad u \leq w \quad \implies \quad x_u(t) \leq y_w(t) \quad \text{for all time}$$

where \leq is the component-wise partial order.

¹Angeli and Sontag, "Monotone control systems", IEEE TAC, 2003

Monotone Dynamical Systems

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
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Theorem¹: Monotonicity test

- 1 $\frac{\partial f}{\partial x}(x, w)$ is Metzler (off-diag ≥ 0)
- 2 $\frac{\partial f}{\partial w}(x, w) \geq 0$



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
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In this talk: monotone system theory for reachability analysis

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Monotone vs. Non-monotone Systems

Examples

Monotone System

$$\frac{d}{dt} \begin{bmatrix} x_1 \\ x_2 \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} x_2^3 - x_1 + w \\ x_1 \end{bmatrix}$$

Non-monotone System

$$\frac{d}{dt} \begin{bmatrix} x_1 \\ x_2 \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} x_2^3 - x_2 + w \\ x_1 \end{bmatrix}$$

Reachability of Monotone Systems

Hyper-rectangular over-approximations

Theorem (classical result)

For a monotone system $\dot{x} = f(x, w)$ with $w \in \mathcal{W} = [\underline{w}, \bar{w}]$

$$\mathcal{R}_f(t, [\underline{x}_0, \bar{x}_0], [\underline{w}, \bar{w}]) \subseteq [x_{\underline{w}}(t), x_{\bar{w}}(t)]$$

where $x_{\underline{w}}(\cdot)$ (resp. $x_{\bar{w}}(\cdot)$) is the trajectory with disturbance \underline{w} (resp. \bar{w}) starting at \underline{x}_0 (resp. \bar{x}_0)

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
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Example:

$$\frac{d}{dt} \begin{bmatrix} x_1 \\ x_2 \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} x_2^3 - x_1 + w \\ x_1 \end{bmatrix}$$

$$\mathcal{W} = [2.2, 2.3] \quad \mathcal{X}_0 = \left[\begin{bmatrix} -0.5 \\ -0.5 \end{bmatrix}, \begin{bmatrix} 0.5 \\ 0.5 \end{bmatrix} \right]$$



Non-monotone Dynamical Systems

Reachability analysis

A large number of the dynamical systems are **not** monotone

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- For non-monotone dynamical systems the extreme trajectories do not provide any over-approximation of reachable sets

Non-monotone Dynamical Systems

Reachability analysis


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
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$$\mathcal{W} = [2.2, 2.3] \quad \mathcal{X}_0 = \left[\begin{bmatrix} -0.5 \\ -0.5 \end{bmatrix}, \begin{bmatrix} 0.5 \\ 0.5 \end{bmatrix} \right]$$



How to over-approximate the reachable sets of non-monotone systems?

Mixed Monotone Theory

Embedding into a higher dimensional system

- **Key idea:** embed the dynamical system on \mathbb{R}^n into a dynamical system on \mathbb{R}^{2n}
- Assume $\mathcal{W} = [\underline{w}, \bar{w}]$ and $\mathcal{X}_0 = [\underline{x}_0, \bar{x}_0]$

Original system

$$\dot{x} = f(x, w)$$

Embedding system

$$\dot{\underline{x}} = \underline{d}(\underline{x}, \bar{x}, \underline{w}, \bar{w}),$$

$$\dot{\bar{x}} = \bar{d}(\underline{x}, \bar{x}, \underline{w}, \bar{w})$$

\underline{d}, \bar{d} are **decomposition functions** s.t.

- 1 $f(x, w) = \underline{d}(x, x, w, w)$ for every x, w
- 2 **cooperative:** $(\underline{x}, \underline{w}) \mapsto \underline{d}(\underline{x}, \bar{x}, \underline{w}, \bar{w})$
- 3 **competitive:** $(\bar{x}, \bar{w}) \mapsto \underline{d}(\underline{x}, \bar{x}, \underline{w}, \bar{w})$
- 4 the same properties for \bar{d}

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- 4 the same properties for \bar{d}

f locally Lipschitz \implies a decomposition function exists

Mixed Monotone Theory

Southeast partial order on \mathbb{R}^{2n}

Southeast partial order \leq_{SE} :

$$\begin{bmatrix} x \\ \hat{x} \end{bmatrix} \leq_{\text{SE}} \begin{bmatrix} y \\ \hat{y} \end{bmatrix} \iff x \leq y \text{ and } \hat{y} \leq \hat{x}$$

Mixed Monotone Theory

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Theorem (Classical Result)

The embedding system is a monotone dynamical system on \mathbb{R}^{2n} with respect to the **southeast** partial order \leq_{SE} :

$$\begin{bmatrix} \underline{x}_0 \\ \bar{x}_0 \end{bmatrix} \leq_{\text{SE}} \begin{bmatrix} \underline{y}_0 \\ \bar{y}_0 \end{bmatrix}, \quad \begin{bmatrix} \underline{u} \\ \bar{u} \end{bmatrix} \leq_{\text{SE}} \begin{bmatrix} \underline{w} \\ \bar{w} \end{bmatrix} \implies \begin{bmatrix} \underline{x}_{[\underline{u}, \bar{u}]}(t) \\ \bar{x}_{[\underline{u}, \bar{u}]}(t) \end{bmatrix} \leq_{\text{SE}} \begin{bmatrix} \underline{y}_{[\underline{w}, \bar{w}]}(t) \\ \bar{y}_{[\underline{w}, \bar{w}]}(t) \end{bmatrix}$$

Mixed Monotone Theory

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Key idea: use monotonicity of the embedding system to study the original dynamical system

A short (and incomplete) Literature review:

J-L. Gouze and L. P. Haderl. [Monotone flows and order intervals](#). Nonlinear World, 1994

G. Enciso, H. Smith, and E. Sontag. [Nonmonotone systems decomposable into monotone systems with negative feedback](#) . Journal of Differential Equations, 2006.

H. Smith. [Global stability for mixed monotone systems](#). Journal of Difference Equations and Applications, 2008

S. Coogan and M. Arcak. [Stability of traffic flow networks with a polytree topology](#). Automatica, 2016

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In this talk: use embedding system to study reachability of the original system

Original System:

$$\frac{d}{dt} \begin{bmatrix} x_1 \\ x_2 \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} x_2^3 - x_2 + w \\ x_1 \end{bmatrix}$$

$$\mathcal{W} = [2.2, 2.3]$$

blue = cooperative, red = competitive

Decomposition function

$$\underline{d}(\underline{x}, \bar{x}, \underline{w}, \bar{w}) = \begin{bmatrix} \underline{x}_2^3 + \underline{w} \\ \underline{x}_1 \end{bmatrix} + \begin{bmatrix} -\bar{x}_2 \\ 0 \end{bmatrix}$$

$$\bar{d}(\underline{x}, \bar{x}, \underline{w}, \bar{w}) = \begin{bmatrix} \bar{x}_2^3 + \bar{w} \\ \bar{x}_1 \end{bmatrix} + \begin{bmatrix} -\underline{x}_2 \\ 0 \end{bmatrix}$$

Mixed Monotone Embedding Systems

Example

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blue = cooperative, red = competitive

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Linear Dynamical System

A structure preserving decomposition function

- Metzler/non-Metzler decomposition: $A = [A]^{Mzl} + [A]^{n-Mzl}$

- Example: $A = \begin{bmatrix} 2 & 0 & -1 \\ 1 & -3 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 \end{bmatrix} \Rightarrow [A]^{Mzl} = \begin{bmatrix} 2 & 0 & 0 \\ 1 & -3 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 \end{bmatrix} \quad [A]^{n-Mzl} = \begin{bmatrix} 0 & 0 & -1 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 \end{bmatrix}$

Linear systems



Original system

$$\dot{x} = Ax + Bw$$

Embedding system

$$\dot{\underline{x}} = [A]^{Mzl} \underline{x} + [A]^{n-Mzl} \bar{x} + B^+ w + B^- \bar{w}$$

$$\dot{\bar{x}} = [A]^{Mzl} \bar{x} + [A]^{n-Mzl} \underline{x} + B^+ \bar{w} + B^- w$$



Decomposition Functions

A Jacobian-based approach

How to compute a decomposition function for a system?

- Assume $f : \mathbb{R} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ is scalar-valued:

Mean-value Inequality

$$f(\underline{x}) + \left[\min_{z \in [\underline{x}, \bar{x}]} \frac{\partial f}{\partial x} \right] (\bar{x} - \underline{x}) \leq f(x) \leq f(\underline{x}) + \left[\max_{z \in [\underline{x}, \bar{x}]} \frac{\partial f}{\partial x} \right] (\bar{x} - \underline{x})$$

Then

$$\begin{bmatrix} \underline{d}(\underline{x}, \bar{x}) \\ \bar{d}(\underline{x}, \bar{x}) \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} \left[\min_{z \in [\underline{x}, \bar{x}]} \frac{\partial f}{\partial x} \right]^+ & \left[\min_{z \in [\underline{x}, \bar{x}]} \frac{\partial f}{\partial x} \right]^- \\ \left[\max_{z \in [\underline{x}, \bar{x}]} \frac{\partial f}{\partial x} \right]^- & \left[\max_{z \in [\underline{x}, \bar{x}]} \frac{\partial f}{\partial x} \right]^+ \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} \underline{x} \\ \bar{x} \end{bmatrix}$$

where $[A]^+ = \max\{A, 0\}$ and $[A]^- = \min\{A, 0\}$.

Decomposition Functions

A Jacobian-based approach

How to compute a decomposition function for a system?


Theorem²

Jacobian-based: $\dot{x} = f(x, w)$ with differentiable f , then

$$\begin{bmatrix} \underline{d}(\underline{x}, \bar{x}, \underline{u}, \bar{u}) \\ \bar{d}(\underline{x}, \bar{x}, \underline{u}, \bar{u}) \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} [\underline{A}]^+ & [\underline{A}]^- \\ [\underline{A}]^- & [\underline{A}]^+ \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} \underline{x} \\ \bar{x} \end{bmatrix} + \begin{bmatrix} [\underline{B}]^+ & [\underline{B}]^- \\ [\underline{B}]^- & [\underline{B}]^+ \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} \underline{w} \\ \bar{w} \end{bmatrix} + \begin{bmatrix} f(\underline{x}, \underline{w}) \\ f(\bar{x}, \bar{w}) \end{bmatrix}$$

$\underline{x} \mapsto R_1 \mapsto R_2 \mapsto \dots \mapsto R_n \mapsto \bar{x}$, then the i -th column of \underline{A} is $\min_{z \in R_i, u \in [\underline{w}, \bar{w}]} \frac{\partial f_i}{\partial x}(z, u)$

- Interval analysis for computing Jacobian bounds.
- `immrax`: Toolbox that implements interval analysis in JAX.



²SJ and A. Harapanahalli and S. Coogan, L4DC, 2023

Decomposition Functions

A Jacobian-based approach

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
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
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Then $\mathcal{R}_f(t, \mathcal{X}_0, \mathcal{W}) \subseteq [\underline{x}(t), \bar{x}(t)]$



³H. Smith, Journal of Difference Equations and Applications, 2008


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a single trajectory of embedding system provides **lower bound** (\underline{x}) and **upper bound** (\bar{x}) for the trajectories of the original system.

³H. Smith, Journal of Difference Equations and Applications, 2008


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a single trajectory of embedding system provides **lower bound** (\underline{x}) and **upper bound** (\bar{x}) for the trajectories of the original system.

(Computational efficient): solve for one trajectory of embedding system

(Scalable): embedding system is $2n$ -dimensional

³H. Smith, Journal of Difference Equations and Applications, 2008

Reachability using Embedding Systems

Example

Original System:

$$\frac{d}{dt} \begin{bmatrix} x_1 \\ x_2 \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} x_2^3 - x_2 + w \\ x_1 \end{bmatrix}$$

$$\mathcal{W} = [2.2, 2.3] \quad \mathcal{X}_0 = \left[\begin{bmatrix} -0.5 \\ -0.5 \end{bmatrix}, \begin{bmatrix} 0.5 \\ 0.5 \end{bmatrix} \right]$$

blue = cooperative, red = competitive

Decomposition function

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
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- Reachability Analysis
- Monotone System Theory
- Neural Network Controlled Systems

Learning-based Controllers in Autonomous Systems


Introduction

- **In this part:** Learning-based component as a controller

Learning-based Controllers in Autonomous Systems

Introduction

- **In this part:** Learning-based component as a controller




Learning-based Controllers in Autonomous Systems

Introduction


- **In this part:** Learning-based component as a controller

Issues with traditional controllers:

- 1 computationally burdensome
- 2 interaction with human
- 3 complicated representation



Self driving vehicles:




M. Bojarski, et al., NeurIPS, 2016.

Robotic motion planning:



M. Everett, et. al., IROS, 2018.

Collision avoidance:



K. Julian, et. al., DASC, 2016.



Safety of learning-enabled autonomous systems **cannot be completely ensured** at the design level⁴

⁴Institute for Defense Analysis, The Status of Test, Evaluation, Verification, and Validation of Autonomous Systems, 2018

Analysis of Learning-based Controllers

Safety Verification

Safety of learning-enabled autonomous systems **cannot be completely ensured** at the design level⁴





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Analysis of Learning-based Controllers

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

Design a mechanism that can do **run-time** safety verification

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Analysis of Learning-based Controllers

Safety Verification

Safety of learning-enabled autonomous systems **cannot be completely ensured** at the design level⁴



Design a mechanism that can do **run-time** safety verification

Our approach: reachable set over-approximations for some time in future.

⁴Institute for Defense Analysis, The Status of Test, Evaluation, Verification, and Validation of Autonomous Systems, 2018

Safety of Neural Network Controlled Systems

Problem Statement


An open-loop nonlinear system with a neural network controller

$$\dot{x} = f(x, u, w),$$

$$u = N(x),$$

safety of the closed-loop system

$$\dot{x} = f(x, N(x), w) := f^c(x, w)$$



Safety of Neural Network Controlled Systems

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
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$u = N(x)$ is **pre-trained** feed-forward neural network with k -layer:

$$\xi^{(i)}(x) = \phi^{(i)}(W^{(i-1)}\xi^{(i-1)}(x) + b^{(i-1)})$$

$$x = \xi^{(0)}, \quad u = W^{(k)}\xi^{(k)}(x) + b^{(k)} := N(x),$$

Safety of Neural Network Controlled Systems

Problem Statement


An open-loop nonlinear system with a neural network controller

$$\dot{x} = f(x, u, w),$$

$$u = N(x),$$

safety of the closed-loop system

$$\dot{x} = f(x, N(x), w) := f^c(x, w)$$



$u = N(x)$ is **pre-trained** feed-forward neural network with k -layer:

$$\xi^{(i)}(x) = \phi^{(i)}(W^{(i-1)}\xi^{(i-1)}(x) + b^{(i-1)})$$

$$x = \xi^{(0)}, \quad u = W^{(k)}\xi^{(k)}(x) + b^{(k)} := N(x),$$

directly performing reachability on f^c is computationally challenging

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
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Rigorousness of control tools + effectiveness of ML tools

Combine our reachability frameworks with neural network verification methods

Input-output bounds: Given a neural network controller $u = N(x)$

$$\underline{u}_{[\underline{x}, \bar{x}]} \leq N(x) \leq \bar{u}_{[\underline{x}, \bar{x}]}, \quad \text{for all } x \in [\underline{x}, \bar{x}]$$

⁵H. Zhang et al., NeurIPS 2018.

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ex. CROWN (H. Zhang et al., 2018), LipSDP (M. Fazlyab et al., 2019), IBP (S. Gowal et al., 2018).

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Neural Network Verification Algorithms

Interval Input-output Bounds

Input-output bounds: Given a neural network controller $u = N(x)$


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CROWN⁵

- Bounding the value of each neurons
- Linear upper and lower bounds on the activation function



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


Safety of Neural Network Controlled Systems

A Compositional Approach

Reachability of open-loop system treating u as a parameter

Neural network verification algorithm for bounds on u

Reachability of open-loop system + Neural network verification bounds



Safety of Neural Network Controlled Systems

A Compositional Approach




$$\dot{x} = d(x, \bar{x}, \underline{u}, \bar{u}, \underline{w}, \bar{w})$$

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


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Composition approach over-approximation:

$$\mathcal{R}_{fc}(t, \mathcal{X}_0, \mathcal{W}) \subseteq [\underline{x}(t), \bar{x}(t)]$$



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


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It lead to overly-conservative estimates of reachable set



Case Study: Bicycle Model



A naive compositional approach

Dynamics of bicycle

$$\dot{p}_x = v \cos(\phi + \beta(u_2)) \quad \dot{\phi} = \frac{v}{l_r} \sin(\beta(u_2))$$

$$\dot{p}_y = v \sin(\phi + \beta(u_2)) \quad \dot{v} = u_1$$

$$\beta(u_2) = \arctan\left(\frac{l_r}{l_f + l_r} \tan(u_2)\right)$$



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

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Goal: steer the bicycle to the origin avoiding the obstacles

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

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- train a feedforward neural network $4 \mapsto 100 \mapsto 100 \mapsto 2$ using data from model predictive control

Reachability of Closed-loop System

Case Study: Bicycle Model


- start from $(8, 8)$ toward $(0, 0)$

- $\mathcal{X}_0 = [\underline{x}_0, \bar{x}_0]$ with

$$\underline{x}_0 = (7.95 \quad 7.95 \quad -\frac{\pi}{3} - 0.01 \quad 1.99)^\top$$

$$\bar{x}_0 = (8.05 \quad 8.05 \quad -\frac{\pi}{3} + 0.01 \quad 2.01)^\top$$

- CROWN for verification of neural network



Embedding system:

$$\dot{\underline{x}} = \underline{d}(\underline{x}, \bar{x}, \underline{u}, \bar{u}, \underline{w}, \bar{w})$$

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
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



Euler integration with step h :

$$\underline{x}_1 = \underline{x}_0 + h\underline{d}(\underline{x}_0, \bar{x}_0, \underline{u}_0, \bar{u}_0, \underline{w}, \bar{w})$$

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Reachability of Closed-loop System

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
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


Euler integration with step h :

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
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



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Stabilizing Effect of Neural Network Controllers

Issues with the compositional approach

Neural network controller as **disturbances** (worst-case scenario)
It does not capture the **stabilizing** effect of the neural network.

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Compositional approach

First find the bounds $\underline{u} \leq Kx \leq \bar{u}$, then

$$\dot{\underline{x}} = \underline{x} + \underline{u} + \underline{w}$$

$$\dot{\bar{x}} = \bar{x} + \bar{u} + \bar{w}$$

This system is unstable.

Interaction-aware approach

First replace $u = -Kx$ in the system, then

$$\dot{\underline{x}} = (1 - K)\underline{x} + \underline{w}$$

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We need to know the **functional** dependencies of neural network bounds

Functional bounds: Given a neural network controller $u = N(x)$

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⁶H. Zhang et al., NeurIPS 2018.

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- Example: CROWN⁶ can provide functional bounds.

CROWN functional bounds:

$$\underline{N}_{[\underline{x}, \bar{x}]}(x) = \underline{A}_{[\underline{x}, \bar{x}]}x + \underline{b}_{[\underline{x}, \bar{x}]},$$

$$\overline{N}_{[\underline{x}, \bar{x}]}(x) = \overline{A}_{[\underline{x}, \bar{x}]}x + \overline{b}_{[\underline{x}, \bar{x}]}$$

CROWN input-output bounds:

$$\underline{u}_{[\underline{x}, \bar{x}]} = \underline{A}_{[\underline{x}, \bar{x}]}^+ \bar{x} + \overline{A}_{[\underline{x}, \bar{x}]}^- \underline{x} + \underline{b}_{[\underline{x}, \bar{x}]},$$

$$\overline{u}_{[\underline{x}, \bar{x}]} = \overline{A}_{[\underline{x}, \bar{x}]}^+ \bar{x} + \underline{A}_{[\underline{x}, \bar{x}]}^- \underline{x} + \overline{b}_{[\underline{x}, \bar{x}]}$$

⁶H. Zhang et al., NeurIPS 2018.

Theorem⁷

Original system

$$\dot{x} = f(x, N(x), w)$$

Embedding system

$$\begin{bmatrix} \dot{\underline{x}} \\ \dot{\bar{x}} \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} \underline{H}^+ & -J_{[x,\bar{x}]} \\ \underline{H}^- & -J_{[x,\bar{x}]} \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} \underline{x} \\ \bar{x} \end{bmatrix} + \begin{bmatrix} -J_{[w,\bar{w}]}^- & J_{[w,\bar{w}]}^+ \\ -J_{[w,\bar{w}]}^- & J_{[w,\bar{w}]}^+ \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} \underline{w} \\ \bar{w} \end{bmatrix} + Q$$

\underline{H} and \bar{H} capture the effect of interactions between nonlinear system and neural network.

Interaction-aware over-approximation:

$$\mathcal{R}_{fc}(t, \mathcal{X}_0, \mathcal{W}) \subseteq [\underline{x}(t), \bar{x}(t)]$$

⁷SJ and A. Harapanahalli and S. Coogan, under review, 2023

Bicycle Model Revisited

Numerical Experiments



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
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- CROWN for verification of neural network



Composition approach



Interaction-aware approach

Case Study: Vehicle Platooning


Numerical Experiments

Dynamics of the j th vehicle

$$\dot{p}_x^j = v_x^j, \quad \dot{v}_x^j = \tanh(u_x^j) + w_x^j,$$

$$\dot{p}_y^j = v_y^j, \quad \dot{v}_y^j = \tanh(u_y^j) + w_y^j,$$

where $w_x^j, w_y^j \sim \mathcal{U}([-0.001, 0.001])$.



Unsafe

Case Study: Vehicle Platooning

Numerical Experiments

Dynamics of the j th vehicle


$$\dot{p}_x^j = v_x^j, \quad \dot{v}_x^j = \tanh(u_x^j) + w_x^j,$$

$$\dot{p}_y^j = v_y^j, \quad \dot{v}_y^j = \tanh(u_y^j) + w_y^j,$$

where $w_x^j, w_y^j \sim \mathcal{U}([-0.001, 0.001])$. First vehicle uses a neural network controller

$4 \times 100 \times 100 \times 2$, with ReLU activations

and is trained using trajectory data from an MPC controller for the first vehicle.



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
$$\dot{p}_y^j = v_y^j, \quad \dot{v}_y^j = \tanh(u_y^j) + w_y^j,$$

where $w_x^j, w_y^j \sim \mathcal{U}([-0.001, 0.001])$. Other vehicles

use PD controller

$$u_d^j = k_p \left(p_d^{j-1} - p_d^j - r \frac{v_d^{j-1}}{\|v^{j-1}\|_2} \right) + k_v (v_d^{j-1} - v_d^j),$$

where $d \in \{x, y\}$.



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
Dynamics of the j th vehicle

$$\dot{p}_x^j = v_x^j, \quad \dot{v}_x^j = \tanh(u_x^j) + w_x^j,$$

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where $w_x^j, w_y^j \sim \mathcal{U}([-0.001, 0.001])$.

- **compositional approach**
- a platoon of 9 vehicles
- reachable overapproximations for $t \in [0, 1.5]$



Case Study: Vehicle Platooning

Numerical Experiments

Dynamics of the j th vehicle


$$\begin{aligned}\dot{p}_x^j &= v_x^j, & \dot{v}_x^j &= \tanh(u_x^j) + w_x^j, \\ \dot{p}_y^j &= v_y^j, & \dot{v}_y^j &= \tanh(u_y^j) + w_y^j,\end{aligned}$$

where $w_x^j, w_y^j \sim \mathcal{U}([-0.001, 0.001])$.

- interaction-aware approach
- a platoon of 9 vehicles
- reachable over-approximations for $t \in [0, 1.5]$

N (units)	# of states	Our Approach (s)	POLAR (s)	JuliaReach (s)
4	16	1.369	14.182	12.579
9	36	3.144	43.428	59.929
20	80	9.737	316.337	—
50	200	46.426	4256.435	—

Table: Run-time comparison



POLAR = C. Huang et al., ATVA 2022

JuliaReach = C. Schilling et al., AAI 2022

Conclusions

Key takeaways

- reachability as a framework for safety certification of autonomous systems
- developed computationally efficient and scalable approaches for reachability using monotone system theory
- run-time verification of neural network controlled systems
- capture stabilizing effect of learning-based components